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INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, aircraft accident data recorded and maintained by 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were analyzed to 
determine what problems exist in the general aviation (GA) single 
pilot instrument flight rules (SPIFR) environment. The results 
of that analysis were based on the data from 1964 to 1975, and 
were used to help structure the NASA Langley Research Center 
SPIFR research program. Since the results of that analysis were 
published, GA SPIFR activity has continued to increase both in 
terms of numbers of flights and numbers of accidents, and the 
accident data from four additional years (1976-1979) have been 
added to the NTSB data base. The purpose of the research and 
analysis upon which this report is based was to determine what 
changes, if any, have occurred in trends and cause-effect rela- 
tionships reported in the earlier study. The increasing numbers 
have been tied to measures of activity to produce accident rates 
which in turn were analyzed in terms of change. Where anomalies 
or unusually high accident rates were encountered, further analy- 
sis was conducted to isolate pertinent patterns of cause factors 
and/or experience levels of involved pilots. 
The first section of the report reviews and examines 
SPIFR accidents in many of the same terms and formats used in the 
original study. Data from the 1964-1975 period were compared 
with data from the 1976-1979 time frame to determine what changes 
are occurring in the SPIFR arena of operations. SPIFR accidents 
are addressed and analyzed in terms of phase of flight, mission 
variables, and pilot experience. In general, there are no major 
surprises in this section as accident trends have remained fairly 
consistent over the years. 
The second section of this report addresses the profiles of 
GA pilots in terms of their experience levels. The results of a 
recent survey conducted by NASA through Ohio State University 
provide a basis for comparing the typical GA SPIFR pilot with a 
profile of the pilot represented in the NTSB accident statistics 
data base. The profiles established in this section are used in 
the later sections to provide comparisons with experience charac- 
teristics of pilots involved in specific classes of accidents. 
The impact of a few specific variables is examined in the 
third section of the report in an attempt to relate types of ac- 
cidents to particular conditions. Type of aircraft, number of 
pilots, and type of terrain are tabulated by category of accident 
to see which impact upon what type of accidents. 
The fourth section of the report explores day and night 
accident rates of the SPIFR pilot. Based upon a Federal Aviation 
Agency (FAA) survey of GA activity, actual day and night accident 
rates are calculated with some rather surprising results. Com- 
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parisons are presented between SPIFR and dual piloted IFR (DPIFR) 
accident rates for both day and night operations, and some of the 
specific characteristics of pilots involved in night accidents 
are addressed. 
The final section presents the results of a comprehensive 
analysis of SPIFR collisions with the ground. Uncontrolled col- 
lisions are examined in depth and comparisons are presented be- 
tween SPIFR landing, DPIFR landing, and SPIFR take-off/enroute 
phase accident statistics. Specific sub-sets of vertigo and 
icing related accidents are analyzed and compared for commonali- 
ties and diversities as are controlled day and night collisions 
with the ground/water. 
The majority of this report concerns the SPIFR pilot in the 
approach/landing phase. Specifically, the 554 accidents analyzed 
in the majority of the report are all landing phase accidents and 
represent only one subset of the 1396 pilot error SPIFR accidents 
in the data base. The reader is invited to explore the many com- 
binations of data in the myriad of charts and tables used in this 
effort and located following the text of this report. There are 
a number of nuances in those tables which provide food for 
thought, speculation, and detailed analysis which the authors of 
this report did not have the time nor the assets to address. 
PREVIOUS TRENDS RE-EXAMINED 
One of the objectives of this report is to update selected 
tables and graphs that were originally published in NASA TM-78773 
(reference A). Those tables and graphs are presented in essen- 
tially the same format as they were in the original report. The 
data has been updated to include the years 1976-1979, and where 
appropriate, columns have been added which present the percentage 
of the table data that is from accidents in the latter time peri- 
od. The general methodology for interpreting indicated trends 
used throughout the analysis of the updated data is a straight 
forward check to see if the proportional increase in a particular 
subset of mishaps for 1976-1979 is distributed in the same manner 
as similar mishaps for the 1964-1975 data. In other words, did 
the number of accidents for each mission variable increase in the 
same proportion as the total increase in the total'number of ac- 
cidents. Given that 216 (39 percent) of the 554 total landing 
phase accidents occurred from 1976 to 1979, the number of acci- 
dents which are associated with each mission variable should re- 
flect a similar increase of approximately 39 percent. 
A 95 percent confidence interval was calculated for the 
proportion of accidents that were categorized for each mission 
variable over the 1976-1979 time frame. Naturally, the larger 
the number of accidents for a particular variable, the smaller 
the acceptable range for the confidence interval and the better 
the test. The estimate of the 1976-1979 proportion (P) for each 
mission variable was calculated as: 
P= _ a+ 1.96 a * (1-a) 
n 
where a= number of accidents 1976-1979 -- ----- number of accidents 1964-1979 
If the confidence interval (P) contains the proportional increase 
of total accidents from 1976 through 1979, then we are 95 percent 
sure that the increase in accidents for the mission variable is 
consistent with the proportion of those type of accidents that 
occurred over the earlier periods. Those variables that failed 
the confidence level test became the subject for further investi- 
gation and discussion. The summaries below provide a brief over- 
view of the updated tables. 
Phase of Flight: From 1964 to 1979, NTSB accident data files 
reveal that 1396 pilot error accidents occurred for SPIFR 
operations covering all phases of flight and all flight plans. 
Figure 1 depicts the breakdown of these accidents by phase. The 
majority of accidents take place in the landing phase of flight. 
The largest proportion of fatal accidents as a proportion of 
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total accidents are found in the enroute phase of flight. No fa- 
tal accidents took place in the static phase. Of the 1396 total 
accidents, 538 (39 percent) have taken place since 1975. The 
distribution of this increase over the various phases of flight 
is depicted graphically in Figure 1 and in the following table. 
Table 1. Percentage Increase in Total Accidents by Phase 
for 1976-1979 
% of Total Accidents % of Fatal Accidents 
Phase 1976-1979 1976-1979 
Taxi 
Takeoff 
Enroute 
Landing 
100 
49 
40 
38 zz 
Notice that each phase has had a proportionate increase in its 
share of accidents over the last 4 years under consideration. 
Fatal accident increases were in line for enroute and landing 
phase operations, while the increase in takeoff fatalities for 
1976-1979 was somewhat larger than expected. The large percen- 
tage increase in fatal accidents for the taxi phase is relatively 
insignificant since only one fatal accident was reported for the 
entire 1964-1974 period. 
The number of accidents by phase of flight and the number of 
general aviation IFR approaches is presented on a yearly basis in 
Figure 2. A linear regression is fitted to each set of data 
points in an effort to determine any basic trends. The slope for 
each line is presented in Table 2 both for the entire 16 year 
period and for the first 12 years so that the influence of the 
last 4 years may be isolated. 
Table 2. Slopes of Linear Regression for Figure 2 
Phase 1964-1975 1964-1979 
Taxi l 0455 
Takeoff -5559 
Enroute 1 l 937 2.794 
Landing 3.5559 3.7927 
IFR Approaches 71768 72332 
The slopes in all cases are positive indicating increasing 
numbers of accidents or approaches over each time frame. Acci- 
dents occurring from 1976-1979, increase the slope of the regres- 
sion lines for all cases. This shows that the number of acci- 
dents and approaches in the last 4 years increased at a rate 
higher than established from 1964-1975. The landing phase of 
flight possessed the highest slope showing that the rate of in- 
crease of accidents per year is highest for this phase. Rates of 
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increase for the taxi and takeoff phase are very low. A test of 
the null hypothesis that the slopes of the taxi and takeoff 
phases are equal to zero against the alternative hypothesis that 
the slopes are not equal to zero for the 1964-1979 period was 
performed in an effort to determine with the given data that the 
regression lines have some rate of change other than zero. At a 
95 percent confidence level, the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected. This indicates that with the data given, the low 
slopes of these two lines are not significantly different from 
zero. (i.e. There has been no change.) 
Figure 3 is a yearly presentation of total single and dual 
pilot IFR accident rates, by phase of flight. The rate is ex- 
pressed as accidents per 100,000 general aviation IFR approaches. 
All linear regression lines fitted to the data have a downward 
slope indicating fewer accidents for any given number of approa- 
ches. In Figure 2, the number of total approaches 'and accidents 
for each phase of flight was shown basically to be increasing. 
Figure 3 indicates the rate of increase of approaches has ex- 
ceeded the increase in accidents for each year. This translates 
into a lower accident rate when approaches are used as an indica- 
tor of exposure level. Table 3 summarizes the slopes of the re- 
gression lines in Figure 3. 
Table 3. Slopes of Linear Regression for Figure 3 
Phase 1964-1975 1964-1979 
Taxi -.054g -.0299 
Takeoff -.0047 -.0027 
Enroute -.4457 -.2698 
Landing -.2404 -.I904 
The absolute value of the slopes for 1964-1975 are greater 
than for 1964-1979 for all phases. This indicates that the in- 
fluence of the 1976-1979 period has been one of a hig;;;o;;zident 
rate than that established in the 1964-1975 period. 
phase accidents had the greatest rate of decrease. As in the 
case of Figure 2, the slopes for the taxi and takeoff phases are 
extremely low. Testing the null hypothesis that the slopes are 
equal to zero against the alternative that they are not equal to 
zero reuslted in the inability to reject the null hypothesis at a 
95 percent confidence level. In other words, the taxi and take- 
off accident rates have not shown a positive or negative change 
over the 1964-1979 period, while the landing and enroute phase 
accident rates have decreased. 
Figure 4 isolates accident data on the landing phase and 
breaks them down by year into groups of single and dual piloted 
operations and further delineates between pilot error and nonpi- 
lot error accidents. Table 4 presents the slopes of the linear 
regression for each set of data. 
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Table 4. Slope of Linear Regression for Total Landing 
Phase Accidents in Figure 4 
Source 1964-1975 1964-1979 
Single Pilot, Pilot Error 
Dual Pilot, Pilot Error 
Single Pilot, Non-Pilot Error 
Dual Pilot, Non-Pilot Error 
:=z: 
3.5662 
-90588 
-:0315 -.0632 
-.04go .0456 
Two aspects of this table should be noted. First, the 
non-pilot error accident slopes are essentially equal to zero. 
The hypothesis that the slopes are equal to zero could not be 
rejected at the 95 percent confidence level. This shows that 
total non-pilot error related accidents have remained at a rela- 
tively constant total number over the 16 year period. Secondly, 
the total number of single piloted, pilot error related accidents 
increased at a greater rate than the dual piloted. From an over- 
all standpoint, 90 percent of the single piloted accidents had 
pilot error as a listed cause/factor, while 83 percent of the 
dual piloted accidents had pilot error listed as a cause/factor. 
Of the total number of accidents, 25 percent were dual piloted. 
Figure 5 presents an alternative view of Figure 4 by 
relating exposure levels to the total number of accidents. The 
general aviation IFR approaches are broken down into estimates of 
single operations and dual piloted operations for each of the 16 
years as was done for the four previous figures. Total accident 
figures for each category are related to the appropriate approach 
figures for single or dual operations, to determine an accident 
rate per 100,000 approaches. The graph of these rates is presen- 
ted in Figure 5. Slopes for each line are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Slopes of Linear Regressions for Figure 5 
Type 1964-1975 1964-1979 
Single Pilot, Pilot Error 
Dual Pilot, Pilot Error 
Single Pilot, Non-Pilot Error 
Dual Pilot, Non-Pilot Error 
-0099 .0104 
l 0457 -.0274 
1017 -.0740 
-:0942 -.0637 
All lines involved have fairly small slopes. The hypothesis 
that the slopes were equal to zero could not be rejected for sin- 
gle and dual pilot, pilot error caused accidents. This implies 
that the two categories of accidents have had a constant accident 
rate over the past 16 years. The single and dual pilot, non-pi- 
lot error related accidents have a small negative slope and are 
statistically different from zero at a 95 percent confidence 
level. The impact of the 1976-1979 data is not consistent in how 
it affects the trends represented by the slopes of the first 12 
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years. It raised the single pilot, pilot error and dual pilot, 
non-pilot error slopes and lowered the other two trend lines. 
Accidents in Terms of Mission Variables: Table 6 presents the 
distribution of SPIFR accidents in terms of obstruction to vision 
and mission variables at the crash site. As was evident in the 
previous report, fog continues to be the primary cause of poor 
visibility being present in 398 (72 percent) of the 554 acci- 
dents. Not surprisingly then, precipitation continued the previ- 
ous trend being present with the fog again in just over half the 
cases (54 percent) which was the same percentage of occurrences 
of precipitation in all accidents. When tested to determine 
whether or not each of the categories have grown proportionately 
to the overall population, two mission variable proportions for 
accidents in 1976-1979 fell outside of the acceptable confidence 
interval. The number of accidents occurring in hilly terrain 
along with those in areas dense with trees both experienced a 
relative decrease, failing outside the low end of the confidence 
interval. 
Table 7 provides the tabulation of SPIFR accidents in terms 
of what impact the condition of light has on selected mission 
variables. The proportion of accidents occurring at night has 
remained virtually unchanged since the previous study dropping 
from 53.7 to 53.1 percent. The proportion of accidents occurring 
during the day, dawn, and dusk periods also remained virtually 
unchanged. Specific accident rates for day and night accidents 
with comparisons between SPIFR and DPIFR (dual piloted IFR) ope- 
rations is provided later in this report. 
The breakdown of mission variables in Table 7 is the 
same as that in Table 6 with the exception of the obstruction to 
vision variables (fog and none) being added to the table. The 
results of tests for trends naturaily would be the same for those 
variables previously tested. The new obstructions to vision ca- 
tegory figures would not really require formal testing since at 
proportions of .40 and .39, we simply confirm our previous con- 
clusion that the impact of fog remains unchanged. 
Table 8 provides the data for SPIFR accidents in terms of 
how the various mission variables impact upon the phase of lan- 
ding. Table 9 provides a breakdown of the proportional increases 
of the number of accidents in each phase of flight, and although 
some of the numbers reflect a 10 to 15 percent change, the chan- 
ges for all phases of flight were found to be statistically in- 
significant at a 95 percent confidence interval with the excep- 
tion of the accidents which occurred during initial approach and 
VFR go-around. The four accident briefs involved in the VFR go- 
around were reviewed, but there was no common denominator in 
those accidents which involved fuel starvation, an icing caused 
stall, and 2 delayed go-arounds. The initial approach phase 
trend change is addressed in the discussion on types of approa- 
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ches below. The increases in accidents by mission variable were 
again the same as discussed for Table 6. In fact, all of the 
observations discussed in the 1964-1975 NASA study remain valid. 
Final approach is still by far the most frequent phase during 
which accidents take place. The final approach and missed ap- 
proach phase accidents are still strongly related to low visibil- 
ity. Almost 30 percent of the final approach and 39 percent of 
the missed approach accidents had visibility of one-half mile or 
less at the accident site. Fog was present in 72 percent of the 
accidents. 
Of particular interest is how the condition of light 
relates to the phase of landing accident. The ratio of night/day 
accidents for each phase of landing is presented in Table 9 for 
the years 1964-1975 and 1964-1979 to provide an indication of how 
the 1976-1979 accidents influenced the total. Comparing the 
ratios in these two rows shows that the differences are relative- 
ly large for the missed approach, roll, final VFR approach, and 
VFR go-around. For the missed approach, final VFR phase of lan- 
ding and VFR go-around, a shift toward more night occurrences has 
taken place since the ratios increased. In the case of the roll 
phase, a shift toward more accidents taking place during the day 
has occurred since the ratio is smaller. 
The magnitudes of the ratios in Table 9 provide a measure 
of the relative difficulties that pilots face in the various 
phases of flight in conditions of darkness. The accidents on 
final approach occur three times more often at night than in day 
light and obviously provide an area for further analysis. The 
vast majority o.f these are classified as controlled or uncon- 
trolled collisions with the ground and are analyzed in-depth la- 
ter in this report. Interestingly, most of the remaining ratios 
fall under 1.0 which reflect more day time accidents than night. 
Although the latter is true in absolute terms, the relative oc- 
currence of night accidents actually ranged from 8 to more than 
20 times higher than day accidents over the 16 years considered 
based upon actual day to night IFR activity. Thus, one would 
have to adjust each of the ratios by the appropriate magnitude to 
determine the true picture of the relative difficulties by phase 
of operation. For our purposes in this section, the ratios re- 
main unadjusted, still providing us with a good relative picture. 
Table 10 provides the tabulation of the SPIFR accidents 
in terms of the type of approach flown as it relates to selected 
mission variables. The only mission variable not previously dis- 
cussed which failed to relfect a proportional increase in acci- 
dents was the initial phase of an approach. It reflected a sta- 
tistically significant lower proportion of accidents for the la- 
ter time period than for the 1964-1975 period. The specific rea- 
son for the relative decrease can be related to a combination of 
changes in other areas that may not be statistically significant 
by themselves, but combine to reflect a favorable rate change in 
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the initial phase. First, referring back to Table 8, we find 
the number of initial phase accidents in mountainous terrain was 
lower than expected, reflecting a mountainous to level ratio of 1 
to 1 (12 accidents in mountainous terrain and 12 in level ter- 
rain) where that ratio was 5 to 4 based on the earlier data. 
Secondly, there was a 4 percent increase in the number of acci- 
dents during precision approaches over non-precision approaches 
flown which most likely reflects a continuing shift away from 
non-precision in favor of precision approaches. The demands on 
the pilot in the initial approach phase are significantly reduced 
in the precision approaches. Since the actual number of each 
type of approach flown could not be found for either time period, 
speculation of the trend of increased precision approaches is 
based upon the comparison of the proportion of accidents that 
occurred by approach type. Of interest in that arena were the 
following specific changes: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
A 4 percent decrease in accidents during 
VOR-only approaches which was offset by a 
3 percent increase in VOR with DME. 
A 4 percent decrease in localizer-only 
approach accidents matched by a 4 percent 
increase in ILS (without advisory) approach 
accidents. 
A 1 percent decrease in ASR-only accidents 
which was matched by a 1 percent increase 
in ILS (with advisory) approach accidents. 
Accidents in Terms of Pilot Experience: A pilot's experience 
may be measured in a number of categories which represent profi- 
ciency levels. Consequently, when expressing accident rates in 
terms of pilot experience, there are a number of relationships 
and methodologies that can be used. Tables ll,l2,l3, and 14 ad- 
dress SPIFR accidents in terms of total pilot hours, actual in- 
strument time, time in the last 90 days, and time in type of air- 
craft. Although the tables are presented to provide indications 
of changes in experience to accident relationships published in 
the earlier SPIFR accident study (reference A), the authors have 
chosen a slightly different measure of accident rates than the 
Reference A which used accidents per 100,000 pilots for each 
experience level. 
Accidents of the type addressed in this study must, by the 
constraints established, have pilot error as a cause/factor. 
If one is trying to relate pilot experience to accidents, 
there is a certain amount of merit in using the direct 
relationship of accidents to the number of pilots at any given 
experience level. However, let us consider the following 
scenario: 
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Out of a group of 5 pilots, each with 100 hours 
of flight time, one pilot has an accident. Over 
the same period, 1 of a group of 3 pilots each 
with 5000 hours has an accident. Measured in terms 
of accidents per pilot, the 100 hour group has an 
accident rate of .2 while the more experienced 
group has an accident rate of .33. However, if we 
consider that the total exposure of the lesser 
experienced pilots is 500 hours as opposed to the 
other group's 15,000 hours, we might want to re- 
assess our measure. We could say that in terms of 
accidents per hours of exposure or experience, the 
lesser experienced group has an accident rate of 
2.0 accidents per 1000 flight hours while the more 
experienced group has a rate of .07 accidents per 
1000 flight hours. 
Which of the above accident rates provide the llbestfl measure of 
the impact of pilot proficiency on accident rates? There are a 
number of other factors which undoubtedly should be considered. 
Particularly germane is whether or not the accident that the ex- 
perienced pilot has is his first? That is, if he also had an 
accident in his first 100 hours, our measure of accidents per 
hour of exposure loses some accuracy. In short, the authors have 
concluded that there is no ideal measure of accident rate that 
can be computed with the data that is currently available on the 
GA pilot. Tables 11, 12, and 13 present accident rates in terms 
of hours of exposure. The main factor in deciding to use this 
measure was that there are very few differences in the actual 
proportions of,accidents that occur at different experience 
levels. Thus, rather than duplicating the results of the previ- 
ous report, we have chosen to present the data in a new light 
which in essence reflects a decreasing rate with experience. We 
do not proclaim this measure to be the most accurate but we do 
find it more intuitively appealing than measuring rates in terms 
of accidents per group. In other words, there is little doubt in 
the author's mind which aircraft he would board as a passenger in 
night IFR conditions if one were piloted by a pilot with 3000 
hours and the other by a neophyte. However, for analysis 
purposes, it is important to keep in mind that when using total 
hours as the basis for rate determination, hours of exposure 
include all pilots as opposed to only SPIFR pilots. 
In order to arrive at a number of accidents per 10,000 
flight hours, estimates for the total number of GA pilots were 
obtained from the FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation 1980 
(reference B). The proportion of pilots that currently exist at 
each experience level was extracted from the data contained in 
the Study to Determine the IFR Operational Profile of the Gene- 
ral Aviation Single Pilot (reference C). The total hoursof 
exposure for each bin is the product of the number of pilots and 
the mean of the experience level covered. The number of hours 
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used for the mean of the highest experience levels which are open 
ended (e.g. >300 or >15,000, etc.), were the means of the re- 
sponses of the NASA GA pilot survey (reference C) which were in 
the specified range. 
The important point in the interpretation of the rates 
presented is that we are interested in trends and indications of 
trouble spots. Thus, the relationship of the rates is the criti- 
cal part of the tables, and that should not be greatly affected 
by the implicit assumptions that we have made but know to be 
inaccurate. The assumptions do not reflect actual conditions in 
that the distribution of pilots and experience levels was not 
constant over the entire 16 year period, and that all GA pilots 
do not necessarily fly single pilot IFR. Additionally, as men- 
tioned on the previous page, total pilot time is not necessarily 
proportional to instrument time. Thus the reader is asked to use 
the accident rates more for their relative than actual values. 
Table 11 presents data on the SPIFR pilot factor landing 
phase accident rates in terms of the pilot's total time. Running 
95 percent confidence level tests on the proportion of accidents 
in each bin that occurred during the 1976-1979 time frame resul- 
ted in acceptable ranges. That is, each included the overall 
proportional increase of 39 percent. Thus, it cannot be shown 
that there has been any change in the proportion of accidents 
experienced by any one group. 
If one compares the trends displayed by the accident rates 
in the bottom row of Table 11 with Table XI in the earlier re- 
port 9 they will find that the tables present different pictures 
of the impact of experience levels on accident rates. (See above 
discussion on rates in this sub-section.) In terms of accidents 
per 10,000 hours, the accident rate continually declines as ex- 
perience is gained in total flight time. Over the first 1000 
hours, the rate tends to decrease geometrically, then from 1000 
to 5000 hours there is a linear decrease of .004 per thousand 
hours of experience. From 5000 hours on, the rate appears to 
decrease linearly at approximately .OOl per 5000 hours. One can 
only speculate that as in any field, experience will never com- 
pletely eliminate human error (i.e. Murphy's Law is applicable 
to aviation just as it is to any other endeavor). 
As noted on Table 11, the number of pilots in the GA 
population was adjusted for the number of pilots in the Ohio 
State survey who did not respond to the query on total flight 
hours. Similarly, adjustments were made and so noted on the ta- 
bles discussed below. 
Table 12 presents the data on the SPIFR accidents in terms 
of the pilot's total actual instrument hours. As was true with 
the.amount of total flight experience a pilot has, it appears 
that the accident rate is extremely high for the neophyte instru- 
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ment pilot (with less than 30 hours actual experience). Then, 
except for an aberration in the 30 to 59 hour bin, the accident 
rate per 10,000 hours decreases as a pilot becomes more experi- 
enced and consequently more proficient at instrument flight. 
The overall proportion of SPIFR accidents which occurred in 
the 1976-1979 time period and reported the pilots actual instru- 
ment time was .37. The 95 percent confidence intervals computed 
for each bin for the estimated proportion of accidents occurring 
in that time frame all inciuded .37. Thus, we are once again 
forced to conclude that there were no trend changes tied to pilot 
instrument proficiency. 
Table 13 presents the data on SPIFR accidents in terms of 
the pilot's time in the last 90 days. Since there was no source 
available to directly provide the number of pilots for each bin 
in terms of the last 90 days' flight hours, the numbers were de- 
rived from the tables in the Ohio State survey that provided 
total time for the past 12 months. Those hours were assumed to 
be distributed normally so were divided by four. Once again, 
although total hours are not necessarily proportional to instru- 
ment hours, if the absolute accuracy is affected, the trend 
information should still be valid. 
In terms of accidents per 10,000 hours, the same trend of 
the rate decreasing with additional experience is again evident. 
However, as one might expect, there is a slight reversal of the 
decreasing rate when a pilot has flown over 300 hours in the past 
90 days. Amassing flight time at that rate would equate to fly- 
ing 100 hours per month or at least 3.3 hours per day, 7 days a 
week. Such a sustained level of operations would be extremely 
taxing regardless of how the hours were actually distributed. 
Sooner or later fatigue is bound to have some impact upon the 
pilot's judgment and/or decision making process. The role fa- 
tigue plays in aviation has long been respected by the airlines 
as is evidenced by the rules and regulations in effect concerning 
maximum amounts of time crew members may log over given time 
intervals. 
The 95 percent confidence interval tests for the propor- 
tional changes in accidents from Reference A failed to identify 
any changes for the accidents that reported time in the last 
90 days, nor were any new trends identified for accidents in 
terms of time in type. The data for the latter is presented in 
Table 14. No attempt was made to identify or associate an acci- 
dent rate with time in type since there is no known source for 
finding how much time the average pilot has in any specific air- 
craft type. One would expect the number of accidents to decrease 
to some extent with experience. Thus, the behavior described in 
the previous NASA report continues to be true as is the apparent 
requirement suggested by that report that pilots adjust their 
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weather minimums to offset lack of total and/or recent experience 
in type. Justification of the need for this adjustment is rein- 
forced later in the report when time in type is related to uncon- 
trolled collisions. 
Summary on Trends. The overall conclusion of the authors after 
compiling and analyzing the data to update the charts from the 
Reference A, is that SPIFR accident frequency, totals, causes, 
and trends have undergone little overall change since the previ- 
ous study. Thus, the conclusions, conjecture, and recommenda- 
tions of the original work remain as valid today as they did when 
written. With this in mind, conjecture on small nuances has been 
held to a minimum so that maximum effort could be devoted to more 
detailed analysis of factors associated with controlled and 
uncontrolled collisions with the ground/water. 
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PILOT PROFILES 
In an effort to determine if those pilots involved in SPIFR 
accidents differ from the entire general aviation population, a 
comparison of pilot instrument and total times between the two 
groups was performed. Characteristics of the typical general 
aviation pilot were obtained from reference C, "Study to Deter- 
mine the IFR Operational Profile of the General Aviation Single 
Pilot". Data available from that survey and the SPIFR accidents 
enabled a comparison to be made of four areas which relate pilot 
experience and capabilities. The areas compared are total simu- 
lated instrument time, total actual instrument time, pilot time 
in the last 90 days, and total pilot time. For each of these 
areas, statistics are presented which compare the distribution of 
pilot experience in each category for the two populations. 
Actual Instrument Time: Total actual intrument time for the 
pilot-in-command was reported for 371 of the 554 SPIFR accidents, 
while 1469 respondents in NASA GA survey reported a total actual 
instrument time of one hour or more. Statistics from an aggre- 
gated level are presented in Table 15. 
Table 15. Total Actual Instrument Time Statistics 
STD. SET 
MEAN DEV. MEDIAN SIZE 
GA Survey 245.25 449.41 150 1469 
SPIFR Accidents 320.23 499 -84 150 371 
Note that while the medians are equal, the means are widely 
divergent. 
Letting 3 ’ X2 ’ Sl 9 S2 9 N, , and N, equal the means, stan- 
dard deviations, and responses of the GA survey and the SPIFR 
accident data sets, a test was performed to determine if the dif- 
ference between x, and x2 is significant statistically or a re- 
sult of randomness. Specifically, an absolute value of z greater 
than or equal to 1.96 
where 
indicates failure to verify with a degree of certainty of 95 per- 
cent the null hypothesis that the means of the two populations 
are equal. In this case, 2~2.63 which results in the rejection 
of the null hypothesis. 
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The unequal distribution of times between the groups is more 
clearly depicted in Table 16. The percentage of pilots with 
actual instrument times less than 60 hours is consistently lower 
for the SPIFR accident data set. For more than 60 hours of time, 
the percentage of pilots for the SPIFR accident data set is equal 
to or greater than the general aviation population set. This 
results in the SPIFR accident group on average having a larger 
percentage of total actual instrument time. 
Simulated Instrument Time: Simulated instrument time was re- 
ported for 294 or 53 percent of the SPIFR accident data set, 
while 1439 responses of greater than zero were reported in GA 
survey. The aggregated statistics are presented in Table 17 be- 
low. 
Table 17. Total Simulated Instrument Time 
STD. SET 
MEAN DEV. MEDIAN SIZE 
GA Survey 166.04 280.28 75 1439 
SPIFR Accidents 95.66 164.80 61 294 
In this case, both the mean and median of the SPIFR 
accidents are lower. than the same estimates of the general avia- 
tion population characteristics. Again let x, , x2 , s, , s2 , N, , 
and N2represent the means, standard deviations, and sample sizes 
for the NASA GA survey and the SPIFR accident data sets. Testing 
the null hypothesis that the two sample sizes are equal against 
the alternative that they are not, the value of Z as. previously 
defined is equal to 5.80. this exceeds the critical value of 
1.96 and the null hypothesis must be rejected at a confidence 
level of 95 percent. 
Table 18 presents the actual distribution of respondents. 
Note that for less than 100 hours, the percentage of respondents 
for the SPIFR accident data set is consistently larger than the 
corresponding set for the GA survey. For more than 100 hours the 
reverse is true. Consequently, this results in the typical SPIFR 
accident characteristically having a smaller amount of total sim- 
ulated instrument time associated with the pilot than for the 
general aviation population. 
Pilot Time Last 90 Days: Pilot time over the last 90 days was 
reported for 447 or 81 percent of the SPIFR accidents. Pilot 
time for the general aviation population was estimated by taking 
one-fourth of the pilot total time in the last twelve months from 
the GA survey. The basic attributes of the two sets of data are 
delineated in Table lg. 
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Table 19. Pilot Time Last 90 Days 
STD. SET 
MEAN DEV. MEDIAN SIZE 
GA Survey 97.92 119.2 56.7 1551 
SPIFR Accidents 98.47 85.9 71 447 
The mean and median of the SPIFR accidents are greater than 
those of the GA Survey, although the relative magnitudes are not 
as great as those found in the previous two comparisons. Testing 
the null hypothesis that the difference between the two means is 
equal to zero against the alternative that their difference is 
not equal to zero, the Z value (as previously defined) is equal 
to . 108558 which is less than the critical value of 1.96. This 
indicates that the difference between the two means is not sta- 
tistically significant. 
Table 20 presents a breakdown of the responses. At less 
than sixty hours, the SPIFR accident set percentage of responses 
was less than or equal to the GA Survey responses. At more than 
sixty hours the opposite is true. This indicates that the pilot 
involved in the SPIFR accident had more time in the last 90 days 
relative to those indicated by the GA Survey. The problem is 
that the percentage differences between the two groups within 
each time range is not large, and this lowers the level of confi- 
dence which may be made concerning significant deviations or 
trends between the distribution of respondents. 
Total Pilot Time: The final category examined concerned the 
total time of the pilot for each of the two groups. For the SPI 
FR accident group, 549 or 99 percent of the accidents had a total 
time reported for the pilot. The GA Survey had 1578 respondents 
of total time greater than zero. Table 21 shows the aggregate 
statistics for the two groups under consideration. 
Table 21. Total Pilot Time 
STD. SET 
MEAN DEV. MEDIAN SIZE 
GA Survey 3814.35 4961.08 2050 1578 
SPIFR Accidents 3867.74 4456.86 2394 549 
While the SPIFR accident mean and median are larger than 
the general aviation estimate, the degree of difference is not 
large. Testing the null hypothesis that the difference between 
the two means is equal to zero could not be rejected. An abso- 
lute value of Z greater than 1.96 was needed to reject the null 
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hypothesis, and when Z was computed as previously defined, its 
value was .00103. Table 22 further emphasizes the similarity 
between the two groups. Note that the percentage of respondents 
for the two groups in each of the time bins showed no consistent 
trend between the bins. As a result, it is difficult to argue 
that the total time response distribution differs significantly 
between the two groups. 
Summary: Based upon the results of this section, the indica- 
tions are that the SPIFR pilot involved in one more more acci- 
dents (i.e. from the NTSB data) has comparable amounts of total 
flight hours and is as current in flight time over the previous 
90 days as is the typical GA pilot. However, there appears to be 
statistically significant differences in the amount of instrument 
experience each of the two groups have. One logically would 
expect the differences between the groups to both be off in the 
same direction for simulated and actual instrument hours, but 
such is not the case. The actual instrument experience of the 
typical NTSB SPIFR pilot is greater than that of the general 
population GA pilot while the latter's simulated instrument ex- 
perience is higher than the NTSB representative. 
The authors are unable to explain the apparent dichotomy 
in the two categories of instrument hours. However, the subject 
is addressed in more detail later in this report in the discus- 
sion of pilot experience in day and night controlled collisions. 
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ACCIDENT TYPES AND RELATIONSHIP TO AIRCRAFT TYPE, NUMBER OF 
PILOTS, AND TYPE OF TERRAIN 
Type Aircraft Versus Accident Type: In an effort to determine 
if any one particular type of aircraft was particularly suscep- 
tible to a category of accident in SPIFR operations, Table 23 was 
compiled. Each accident type and its respective number of occur- 
rences is broken down by aircraft type. Four aircraft types were 
used and are presented with their respective percentages of total 
accidents below: 
Table 24. Aircraft Type and Percentage of 
Total SPIFR Accidents 
Aircraft Type % of Total Accidents 
Single engine fixed gear 16 
Single engine retractable gear 22 
Multi-engine piston 57 
Turbo-prop 5 
Reference A presented a discussion on the fact that from 
1964 to 1975, there were a disproportionately large number of 
twin engine aircraft SPIFR accidents relative to the percentage 
of twins involved in SPIFR operations. The conclusion in that 
report was that approximately 58 percent of SPIFR accidents oc- 
curred in twins although that class of aircraft was only involved 
in 45 percent of the SPIFR operations. If we logically include 
turbo-prop in the twin engine class and use the entire 16 years 
of NTSB data, we see that 62 percent of pilot caused SPIFR acci- 
dents have occurred in twins. However, not only has the percen- 
tage gone up 4 points, but according to the recent NASA GA sur- 
vey, currently only 29.5 percent of the GA pilots fly in twin 
engine aircraft as an IFR single pilot. According to the FAA 
Statistical Handbook on Aviation for Calendar Year 1980 (refer- 
ence B), there were 30.3 million single engine GA hours flown in 
1979 as opposed to 8.6 million twin engine hours. Although those 
figures cover all GA operations, the proportion of twin time is 
0.22 which certainly lends credence to the results of the NASA GA 
survey. Some of the problems of single versus twin engine acci- 
dent rates and relevant factors are addressed in-depth in the 
discussion of collisions with the ground/water later in this re- 
port. 
Using the data in Table 23, tests were performed to deter- 
mine for each accident type whether or not the differences in the 
proportions of aircraft types involved in each category of acci- 
dent are significant or whether they can be attributed to chance. 
A chi-square test of the null hypothesis that the proportions of 
aircraft types involved in a particular type of accident are 
statistically equal was performed. Four accident types failed 
18 
the test at a significance level of 95 percent, indicating that 
the proportion of accidents by aircraft types are not statisti- 
cally equal. The four categories that failed are gear col- 
lapsed, nose over/down, uncontrolled collisions and overshoot. 
The percentage of occurrence for each aircraft type of these ac- 
cidents is presented below. 
Table 25. Percentage of Total Accidents for 
Aircraft and Accident Types Failing 
Chi-Square Test 
GEAR NOSE UNCONTROLLED OVER- 
COLLAPSED OVER/DOWN COLLISION SHOOT 
% of Single Engine 
Fixed Gear 1.15 3.45 11.49 10.34 
% of Single Engine 
Retractable Gear 0 0 10.57 .81 
% of Multi-Engine 
Piston 1.25 0 5.35 6.60 
% of Turbo-Prop 7.70 0 0 0 
For the gear collapsed accident type, the number of turbo-prop 
accidents is disproportionately high. Single engine fixed gear 
aircraft in the nose over/down type of accident have a larger 
proportion than expected. For the overshoot type of accident, 
single engine retractable gear and turbo-props have low 
proportions and single engine fixed gear and multi-engine piston 
have higher proportions. Finally, for uncontrolled collisions, 
single engine aircraft are more susceptible than multi-engine 
aircraft. Speculation on the reason for the anomalies in this 
data would all center around the proficiency of the pilots in- 
volved with the exception of the landing gear failures and nose- 
avers/downs. The section of this report on Collisions with the 
Ground/Water addresses proficiency. The landing gear failures in 
turbo-props reflects only two occurrences and the nose-overs are 
possibly related to single engine aircraft by the sheer number 
that have conventional as opposed to tricycle landing gear. 
Single versus Dual Piloted Accident Types: In an effort to 
determine whether or not the number of pilots in an aircraft in- 
fluences the type of accident, Table 26 was compiled. A chi- 
square test was performed to see if the differences between the 
two proportions for each accident type is statistically signifi- 
cant at a 95 percent confidence level or is due to chance. The 
right hand columns of Table 26 present the differences in the 
percentages between the two types of configurations. At the 95 
percent confidence level, the chi-squared tests revealed that 
none of the proportions are statistically significant. Thus, we 
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are forced to assume that aircraft accident categories are inde- 
pendent of whether the aircraft involved is single or dual pilo- 
ted. This was further verified in the investigation of uncon- 
trolled collisions with the ground and is addressed later in this 
report-. 
Type of Terrain Versus Accident Type: Of the 554 SPIFR acci- 
dents considered, 313 (or 56 percent) reported the type of ter- 
rain in which the accident occurred. As can be seen from Table 
27 below, only 27 (or 9 percent) of the 313 accidents occurred 
in mountainous terrain. 
Table 27. 
Mountainous 
Non-Mountainous 
Unfortunately, a 
determination to 
Total Mountainous and Non-Mountainous 
Accidents VS Accident Types 
Engine 
Controlled Uncontrolled Failure/ 
Collision Collision Malfunction Other 
24 1 1 1 
164 36 39 47 
source could not be located which would allow a 
be made on the amount of IFR activity that oc- 
curs in mountainous terrain. That fact coupled with the magni- 
tude of the figures in row one of Table 27 made it impossible to 
conduct any statistical analysis of the relationship of terrain 
to accident types. As shown by the data in Table 27, the num- 
ber of controlled collisions in proportion to the total number of 
accidents in mountainous terrain is obviously significant. (i.e. 
In mountainous terrain, 89 percent of the SPIFR pilot error acci- 
dents were controlled collisions as opposed to 57 percent for 
that proportion in nonmountainous terrain.) 
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DAY VS NIGHT GENERAL AVIATION OPERATIONS 
Introduction. A pilot who has sat at the controls of an air- 
craft while cruising over sparsely populated countryside on a 
moonless night knows that it is not the same as being in the same 
situation on a bright sunny day. The feeling can be compounded 
by real or sometimes imagined "night noises" from the power plant 
or by the briefest flicker of a warning light on the instrument 
console. However, many of the differences in a pilot's psycholo- 
gical outlook between day and night VFR are easily explainable in 
terms of security. The potential of a controlled ditching in the 
daytime does not have quite the trauma of a night ditching, nor 
does a well defined day horizon pose the additional workload that 
a pilot encounters on a hazy moonless night. There are other 
differences between day and night VFR, and most are just as easi- 
ly explained as the foregoing. However, when one addresses the 
differences between day and night IFR operations, they are not as 
easily explainable. When a pilot is in actual instrument condi- 
tions in clouds whose bases are two or three hundred feet above 
the ground, his visual cues as well as options in emergency con- 
ditions are theoretically not a great deal different whether it 
is day or night. There is no horizon and he is at the mercy of 
fate in an emergency ditching regardless of whether it is day- 
light or dark. Psychologically, there are differences between 
day and night IFR, but based strictly on the simplistic physical 
aspects, one logically would expect comparable day and night ac- 
cident statistics in the low ceiling/visibility environment. 
The initial comparison between day and night accidents 
revealed a rather startling disparity between their absolute ac- 
cident rates. Analysis efforts were directed towards determining 
what factors are predominant in specific types of night accidents 
and/or which factors produce such relatively high night accident 
rates. The discussion that follows is divided into three major 
sections. The first addresses how objective rates were calcula- 
ted, and compares them between day, night, single, and dual pi- 
loted operations. The next two sections present the results of 
the data reduction and analysis concerning controlled and uncon- 
trolled collisions with the ground. 
Day Versus Night Rates: A previous section discussed the fact ---___ 
that the absolute number of night SPIFR accidents involving pilot 
error has increased over the past four years at essentially the 
same rate as that of day and total accidents. The significance 
of the numbers involved does not become very meaningful however, 
until they are converted to rates in the context of overall day 
and night activity. Unfortunately, there are not a large number 
of sources available which describe how many successful IFR 
flights or hours are flown in the day and/or night. Although the 
FAA maintains data on gross numbers of instrument approaches 
flown, the time of day and condition of light are not recorded. 
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However, during a literature review at the FAA's Technical Libra- 
ry in Washington, D.C., a report was found which provides a 
breakdown of hourly general aviation activity. This report, 
"General Aviation Pilot and Aircraft Activity Survey" (GAPAAS) by 
Susan J. Pinciaro (reference D) was produced by the FAA Office 
of Management Systems Information and Statistics Division. 
GAPAAS presents the results of a survey which was conducted by 
the FAA with the assistance of the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) for the 
purpose of acquiring current 1978 data on a wide range of general 
aviation characteristics. The survey was conducted at a statis- 
tically designed sample of 220 airports which are open to the 
public, and which represent a cross-section of airports with re- 
spect to FAA region and airport type. Although GAPAAS addressed 
many other general aviation topics, the results of the traffic 
activity efforts were specifically extracted and used by the au- 
thors of this report as a basis for estimating general aviation 
IFR activity in terms of approaches flown. The following para- 
graph provides a brief summary of the method used to convert the 
activity data from the FAA work to data germane to this project. 
The GAPAAS activity tables are divided into three categories 
based on airport type. These are towered airports, non-towered 
airports with paved lighted runways, and unlighted and private 
airports. The GAPAAS estimates for the percentage of overall 
general aviation activity at the three airport types are: 
TOWERED NON-TOWERED OTHER 
29.61% 50.81% 19.58% 
Although there may be a small amount of activity at non-lighted 
airports during darkness using flare pots and/or aircraft landing 
lights, the,authors assumed that nighttime activity only occurs 
at airports of the first two categories. 
GAPAAS provides hourly estimates of activity during the time 
frame 0600-2059 for all public airports. The activity during the 
hours of 2100 to 0559 was given as 7 percent of the total activ- 
ity during the period 0600-2059 for towered airports and 3 per- 
cent for airports in the non-towered paved lighted runway catego- 
ry. A determination of the hours constituting day and night 
operations was based upon the average sunset time over a calendar 
year (taking into account daylight savings time) as being 1850 
which was rounded to 1900 hours. Daylight operations were then 
defined as those occurring between the hours of 0600 and 1859, 
and nighttime operations, those that occur between the hours of 
1900 and 0559. 
GAPAAS provides hourly estimates for the typical weekday 
and weekend. These were combined by a weighted average reflec- 
ting five weekdays and two weekend days in the week. From this, 
a breakdown by percentage of day versus night activity was ob- 
tained for each airport type and is presented in the following 
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table. 
Table 28. Percentage of Total General Aviation Activity 
Towered Non-Towered 
Day Night Day Night 
Other 
24.39 5.22 43.53 7.28 19.58 
These total estimates include air taxi and commuter air carrier. 
The following table breaks out flying in three broad categories 
in terms of purpose. 
Table 29. Percentage of General Aviation, Air Taxi, and 
Commuter Air Carrier Activity from GAPAAS 
Towered Non-Towered Other 
General Aviation Day 22.98 41.01 19.58 
General Aviation Night 4.917 6.86 
Air Taxi Day 1.0 1.784 
Air Taxi Night .214 .214 
Commuter Air Carrier Day ,415 l 74 
Commuter Air Carrier Night .089 . 124 
Since the percentage of day versus night activity was desired for 
general aviation and air taxi only, the commuter air carrier ac- 
tivity was disregarded and the resulting overall levels of acti- 
vity are as follows. 
Table 30. General Aviation and Air Taxi Activity Percentage 
by Day and Night 
Day Night 
General Aviation 87.6 12.4 
Air Taxi 84.4 15.6 
These figures were applied to total instrument approaches flown 
(reference B) to estimate day versus night figures for the two 
categories. Prior to 1972, air taxi figures were included in 
those for general aviation. Where applicable, general aviation 
data over the 1964-1971 time frame were adjusted to remove the 
air taxi influence. This was done by assuming that air taxi 
operations constituted the same percentage of general aviation 
operations over the 1964-1971 period as in the known 1972-1979 
period. Thus, the end result used as the estimator for day ver- 
sus night activity for this report is the assumption that 87.6 
percent of general aviation approaches are flown during the day. 
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Based upon an activity ratio of 87.6 to 12.4, tables were 
compiled to provide direct comparisons between day and night ac- 
cident rates in terms of thousands of IFR approaches flown. Na- 
turally, there is room for debate upon the absolute accuracy of 
the day/night estimator. Sampling methods used in the GAPAAS 
survey, assumptions that IFR operations remain proportional to 
combined VFR and IFR operations, and the propensity to fly in 
night IFR conditions alluded to in the NASA GA survey are but 
a few of the factors that may bias the estimator one way or the 
other. However, the important point is that the accident rates 
were analyzed on an annual basis, so that even if bias exists, it 
should remain constant so that trends are realistically re- 
flected. 
In order to compare single piloted to dual piloted rates, 
another estimator was required. In this case, the results of the 
NASA GA survey were used. Respondents who did most of their fly- 
ing with two qualified pilots on board were considered to be dual 
piloted and the remainder considered to be single piloted. The 
percentages in each category were 72% single piloted and 28% dual 
piloted. 
Accident rates were calculated for IFR landing phase 
accidents involving pilot error in terms of the number of instru- 
ment approaches flown each year as reported in the "FAA Statisti- 
cal Handbook of Aviation" series. The rates are broken down into 
single and dual piloted operations by day and night using the 
ratios described in the preceding paragraphs. The basic data and 
accident rates are presented in Tables 31 and 32 for single and 
dual piloted aircraft, respectively. The magnitude of night lan- 
ding accident rates when compared to daytime rates accentuates 
the severity of the problems involved with night IFR operations. 
Table 33 presents a matrix of ratios between the various types of 
accident rates. As can be seen by the average ratios, the dis- 
proportionate number of night accidents is not -peculiar to single 
piloted aircraft as both dual and single piloted aircraft have 
experienced slightly over 10 times as many accidents at night in 
terms of approaches flown as have occurred during the day over 
the 16 years studied. There have been relatively more SPIFR ac- 
cidents overall as can be seen again by the average ratios in 
Table 33. (i.e. The SPIFR rates have been on the average 1.26 
and 1.67 times higher than DPIFR rates for day and night, respec- 
tively.) 
In an effort to determine whether the problem is getting 
better or worse, a linear regression was used to fit each of the 
accident rate sets to straight lines. The plotted regression 
lines were purposely omitted from this report since the majority 
of the fits were very poor. For the full sixteen years of data, 
the SPIFR and DPIFR lines had negative slopes for night rates 
C-.025 and -.013, respectively) and practically a 0 slope C.0007 
for both) when day rates were fitted. The value of R squared 
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never exceeded . 16 indicating the lack of fit between data. How- 
ever, when the data were broken down into two segments which co- 
vered the periods. of 1964-75 and 1976-79, there was a significant 
change in the picture. Although rates for the earlier time peri- 
od continued to correlate poorly, the curves for both single and 
dual piloted night rates over the later time frame reflected a 
very definite increase in rates with relatively better fits. 
From 1976 through 1979, the curves reflected positive slopes of 
.026 and .041 for SPIFR and DPIFR night rates with R squared be- 
ing .56 and .70, respectively. The daytime rates again reflected 
poor fits with R squared less than . 1 in both cases and slopes of 
.003 in both cases. Table 34 contains the values for the slopes 
and R squared for all cases. 
Regardless of how much credence one gives to the statistics 
discussed above, or to the methodology used to derive the actual 
accident rates, there is no doubt that night IFR operations pose 
some very serious problems. In an effort to Itzero in" on some of 
the problems associated with night IFR approaches, a detailed 
analysis was conducted on two sub-sets of those accidents in 
hopes of determining what unique phenomenon is or are responsible 
for the night rate being over 10 times the day rate when theore- 
tically the circumstances are the same but for the amount of am- 
bient light. Detailed analyses were conducted on controlled col- 
lisions with the ground and/or objects on the ground and on un- 
controlled collisions with the ground/water. The analyses and 
results are discussed in the following section of this report. 
The NASA GA survey hypothesized that operational problems 
experienced by the SPIFR pilot are independent of experience 
level. Prior to breaking down the data for specific accident 
types, an overall tabulation was made to see if total flight ex- 
perience is related to night landing phase SPIFR pilot error ac- 
cidents any differently than to day and/or all SPIFR pilot error 
landing phase accidents. Table 35 presents the tabulated results 
of that effort. Although the problems encountered by all pilots 
may be similar, indications are that the less experienced pilot 
has slightly more difficulty handling the night environment. 
As can be seen from Table 35, pilots with 1000 or more 
hours of total flight experience have almost exactly half of this 
type mishap in the day and half at night. (The fact that expo- 
sure time is less at night and absolute rates are higher does not 
affect the proportion of day vs night occurrences so was disre- 
garded in this table.) Pilots with less than 1000 hours seem to 
have slightly more accidents at night than in the daylight. Spe- 
cific proportions are 51 and 56 percent, respectively, for night 
compared to day accidents for the group with over 1000 and less 
than 1000 hours, respectively. 
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Ideally, one should consider the proportion of day to night 
accidents in terms of accumulated night time. However, the 
amount of night time a pilot has is seldom reported upon in the 
NTSB data base for daylight accidents. Thus, a meaningful pro- 
portion of day to night accidents could not be established based 
on accumulated night time. However, the fact that the group of 
pilots with 600 to 1000 total hours had 61 percent of their acci- 
dents at night opens the door to an interesting hypothesis as 
explained below. 
Generally speaking, a pilot with a new instrument rating 
is not likely to start right into challenging night IFR weather 
until he has built his confidence on day VFR and IFR instrument 
experience. Thus, one could hypothesize that the group in Table 
35 with less than 400 hours is likely exposed to very few night 
IFR operations. If we then consider the next two groups 
(400-999) as representative of the low end of the experience 
spectrum, we find that almost 60 percent of their accidents in- 
volving pilot factor in the landing SPIFR environment occur at 
night. Thus, we can hypothesize that although the problems en- 
countered remain the same, total flight experience does in fact 
influence a pilot's ability to cope with the additional burdens 
of night IFR operations. 
Ideally, the findings above should be verified by comparing 
pilot's instrument and night time for day versus night accidents. 
Those figures were tabulated but had to be disregarded due to the 
high number of accident reports that did not include that data. 
Night time was seldom included in a day accident report, and to- 
tal instrument time was included in 10 percent more night than 
day accident reports. In short, the best that can be done is the 
above hypothesis based upon total flight time which was reported 
for all accidents. 
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CONTROLLED/UNCONTROLLED COLLISIONS 
Introduction: Of the 554 accidents that occurred between 1964 
and 1979 that involved pilot error in a landing phase SPIFR envi- 
ronment, 255 were classified as a controlled collision with the 
ground/water or some other object growing from or resting on the 
ground. Additionally, there were 40 uncontrolled collisions with 
the ground/water and 48 stall accidents. Together, these three 
types of accidents made up 62 percent of the mishaps in the de- 
fined subset. This group of accidents was segregated from the . 
data base and analyzed in detail in an attempt to correlate a 
cause and/or pilot characteristic with the accident type, but 
more specifically, to try to determine factors that may be unique 
to night accidents. All controlled collisions with the ground/ 
water, trees, or any other stationary object were put into a 
group that is henceforth referred to simply as controlled colli- 
sions. All stall type accidents were reviewed on a case by case 
basis, and those that involved a spin or uncontrolled flight and/ 
or uncontrolled collision with the ground were grouped with the 
other uncontrolled collisions. Only 27 of the 48 stall accidents 
were used as the remainder fell into the stall-mush category 
which occurred almost exclusively in the latter stages of final 
approach and/or landing when airspeed became too low to sustain 
flight due to unfamiliarity with the aircraft, icing, inatten- 
tion, etc. The assumption that most occurred after visual con- 
tact was made led the authors to exclude those from both con- 
trolled and uncontrolled collisions. 
Uncontrolled Collisions: The initial subset of accidents 
considered for this part of the analysis was a group of 67 acci- 
dents which met the criteria used previously in this report. 
(i.e. SPIFR landing phase with pilot error as one of the cause 
factors.) However, it soon became apparent that to do the analy- 
sis justice, other data should be compared to the initial analy- 
sis results. Thus, two additional groups of accident statistics 
were analyzed and used for comparison. One group contained all 
dual pilot accidents which met the same criteria as the single 
piloted subset, and the second group included all SPIFR take-off 
and enroute accidents that listed spatial disorientation and/or 
icing as a cause factor and resulted in an uncontrolled collision 
with the ground/water. For purposes of the following discussion, 
the three groups will be addressed as SPIFR landing, DPIFR lan- 
ding, and SPIFR enroute. 
As was discussed in Ref. A, the major causes of uncontrolled 
collisions continues to be spatial disorientation (vertigo) and/ 
or icing. For analysis purposes, the uncontrolled collision ac- 
cidents were grouped into three subsets; vertigo, icing, and 
other. The latter was used when neither of the former were lis- 
ted as cause factors even through one or the other was insinua- 
ted. (There were repeated occurrences of reports that simply 
27 
said the pilot lost control at too low an altitude to effect a 
recovery.) When spatial disorientation was listed as a cause fac- 
tor along with icing and/or turbulence, the accident was not 
included as a vertigo caused accident. This method of accounta- 
bility was used in an attempt to keep the vertigo subset as a 
reflection of situations where there were minimal external influ- 
encing factors. 
Of the 67 SPIFR landing phase accidents, 26 (38.8 percent) 
were attributed to vertigo, 23 (34.3 percent) to icing, and the 
remaining 18 (26.9 percent) to other causes. Table 36 presents 
the breakdown of those figures along with the same data for SPIFR 
enroute and DPIFR landing phase accidents. 
Vertigo Caused Uncontrolled Collisions: As can be extracted 
from Table 36, 
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vertigo as the primary cause factor accounts for 
43.4 percent of all SPIFR uncontrolled collisions with the ground 
when pilot error is a factor. Enroute DPIFR data were not 
available but it can be seen that over half of the DPIFR uncon- 
trolled collisions are due to vertigo. This class of accident 
warranted detailed analysis for two very disturbing reasons. 
First, the accident is generally pimarily caused by human er- 
ror, so should be correctable to some extent. The second cause 
for concern is the sad injury statistics associated with this set 
of accidents. Of the 56 SPIFR accidents, there was only one ac- 
cident without fatalities and that outcome appears to be the re- 
sult of extreme luck or good fortune. (i.e. The pilot hit a hil- 
lside in the fog while experiencing vertigo and all 4 aircraft 
occupants escaped injury.) In the remaining 55 accidents, there 
were only 3 with survivors, with the overall statistics being 142 
fatalities and 6 serious injuries. A detailed examination of 
factors involved revealed the following facts/statistics on ver- 
tigo caused uncontrolled collisions. 
Note: DPIFR vertigo related accidents were omitted 
from most of the discussion in the remainder of this 
subsection due to the small sample size. i.e. 9 
landing phase accidents over 16 years. 
1. Condition of .Light: As presented in Table 37, 73 
percent of the SPIFR landing phase vertigo accidents occurred at 
night while 60 percent of the DPIFR accidents in that category 
occurred at night. However, during climb-out and enroute opera- 
tions, only 35 percent of the vertigo accidents occurred at 
night. 
2. Total Instrument Time Versus Condition of Light: As 
presented in Table 38, of the 14 SPIFR vertigo induced night ac- 
cidents in the landing phase with recorded total instrument time, 
10 involved pilots with less than 60 hours of actual instrument 
time. Only 2 of the 5 day mishaps in that category involved pi- 
lots with less than 60 hours of actual instrument time. For the 
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enroute accidents, 5 of the 6 reported instrument times for the 
night mishaps fell in the less than 60 actual instrument hour 
category. The day enroute SPIFR accidents were more evenly dis- 
tributed but still had 5 of the 11 occurring in the less than 60 
hour category. 
39 Time in Type Versus Condition of Light: As shown by 
Table 39, 4 of the 6 night enroute mishaps reporting time in type 
for enroute accidents involved pilots with less than 50 hours in 
type. Day time landing phase mishaps tended to reflect slightly 
more time in type, but all 9 reported involved pilots with less 
than 200 hours in type. Pilots with more than 500 hours in type 
accounted for 5 day enroute mishaps and 5 night landing mishaps. 
There were no day landing mishaps nor night enroute mishaps in- 
volving the over 500 hours in type group. 
4. Total Flight Time Versus Condition of Light: Table 40 
presents the tabulation of total flight hours accumulated by the 
pilots involved in day and night mishaps. Occurrences seem to be 
relatively evenly distributed over the spectrum of experience 
levels over the first 3000 hours of flight experience. 
5. Total Night Time Versus Night Mishaps: Table 41 pre- 
sents the distribution of pilot night time for those mishaps 
which occurred at night. Once again, the lower experience ranges 
have more occurrences than the higher experience ranges. (12 had 
less than 100 hours of night time and 4 between 100 and 200 out 
of the 22 incidents which reported night time.) 
6. Experience Profile: Table 42 presents a comparison be- 
tween experience levels of the typical pilot from the GA pilot 
survey, the NTSB SPIFR landing phase pilot factor accident 
population, the SPIFR vertigo landing phase population, and the 
SPIFR vertigo enroute population. As would be expected from 
the data presented in paragraphs 1 through 5 above, the average 
pilot involved in vertigo induced accidents is less experienced 
than the overall populations. The most significant differ- 
ence in pilot experience appears in the realm of total actual 
instrument time. Where the median for both of the larger popu- 
lations is 150 hours, the median for both of the vertigo popula- 
tions is slightly less than one-third as much experience in actu- 
al instrument conditions. (i.e. Just under 50 hours versus 150.) 
The proportions of simulated time indicate that simulated instru- 
ment experience is less important since the medians are fairly 
consistent except for the fact that all three populations based 
upon the accident data base are reflecting less time than the 
GA survey average simulated median. The total flight time medi- 
ans indicate that the pilot involved in the vertigo accident have 
roughly half the number of hours that their contemporaries have 
in the other two populations. Finally, time in the last 90 days 
appears to be more independent although the vertigo medians are 
again lower than those in the larger populations. 
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Vertigo Accident Discussion and Conclusions: The statistics 
summarized in paragraphs 1 through 6 above-and presented in Ta- 
bles 37 through 42 indicate that pilot experience levels in gene- 
ral are definitely related to the occurrence of vertigo induced 
accidents. Actual instrument experience and total flight hours 
appear to be the most critical experience factors when compared 
to other populations. Indications are that night time and time 
in type are also important factors in vertigo induced accidents, 
especially those that occur at night. However, the data for the 
last categories were not available from the general population of 
general aviation for comparison. 
An important point for the reader to remember is that the 
statistics and tables relevant to this discussion on vertigo are 
based on the NTSB data base and consequently are subject to some 
amount of inaccuracy based upon unknown and/or unreported data. 
An additional point is the fact that pilots of different experi- 
ence levels are exposed to the elements at different rates based 
upon total experience and their propensity to fly under more de- 
manding instrument conditions. The effect'of experience is 
graphically illustrated in Table 42. All of the means in that 
table are significantly greater than the medians. This reflects 
the fact that there are more pilots in the lower experience 
levels than in the higher levels and that the former naturally 
have more accidents. But it also indicates that in terms of to- 
tal hours of exposure, the inexperienced pilot has more accidents 
than the experienced pilot. The reader is invited to use the 
data to address theories that are not addressed elsewhere in this 
report. 
In addition to tabulating and analyzing the numbers involved 
in this section, the accident brief for every SPIFR vertigo 
caused mishap was reviewed for the contents of investigator com- 
ments. Since those comments are sometimes of a speculative na- 
ture and purely subjective, tabulation was not attempted. How- 
ever, there were areas that warrant comment and provide substance 
for future investigation. Thus, the authors offer the following 
comments for the reader's evaluation and consideration. 
1. A large number of accidents contained a comment alluding 
to the fact that the pilot continued flight into conditions that 
exceeded his capabilities. It seems rather obvious that an acci- 
dent would not have occurred if this were not the case, so on the 
surface the comment does not appear to add anything to an acci- 
dent brief. The point to ponder is not whether or not the remark 
is redundant, but more importantly, how does a pilot know when he 
is about to exceed his capabilities? Obviously, the only way to 
answer such a question is after the fact. Whether or not there 
is a mishap is the only real measure of whether one has over- 
stepped their capabilities. Education of the GA pilot appears to 
be a continuing need in the area of statistics which will more 
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concretely marry experience levels to accident conditions. 
2. A second area where education and reinforcement could be 
used is on the subject of physiology connected with vertigo. 
There were repeated cases of vertigo being induced when the pilot 
was temporarily distracted from his instrument scan. Two specif- 
ic cases concerned pilots having to change transponder settings. 
In both cases the pilot lost control of the aircraft and became 
fatalities of their own error. The GA pilot should be reminded 
on a continuing basis of the effects of sudden and/or rapid head 
movements when there is no visual reference to the horizon. 
39 Of particular concern to this author are those accidents 
where the pilot reported his attitude gyro becoming unreliable. 
One cannot help but speculate that in many cases where a pilot 
reported his gyro becoming unreliable (as opposed to it failing 
completely) whether in fact the situation existed where the pilot 
was beginning to pay more heed to erroneous signals from his in- 
ner ear than to the total picture his instruments provided. Most 
gyros have an OFF flag that appears when the instrument loses 
power or is not providing reliable information. A short case 
history of an incident that fell short of being an accident 
should illustrate this point. 
A relatively new military aviator in a single engine single 
seat jet commenced a GCA at NAS Oceana, Virginia. The GCA 
was required due to a fog bank which had formed with the base 
at 300 feet and tops at 1500 feet. The attitude gyro in the 
aircraft had a history of tending to precess in long extended 
turns. The aircraft gear and flaps were lowered while simul- 
taneously beginning a descent from 1500 to 1200 feet. As the 
aircraft entered the clouds, the gyro indicated a slow roll 
commencing to the left while the pilot's "inner ear" was re- 
porting wings level or a slow roll to the right. The pilot's 
reaction was to assume the gyro was in the process of fail- 
ing. A transition to partial panel instrument flying was 
unsuccessful due to the needleball and directional gyro now 
giving erratic indications. The aircraft broke out of the 
bottom of the 300 foot overcast nose low and in a steep bank. 
A recovery was made short of the tree tops and the aircraft 
reentered the cloud layer at 100 percent power and climbing. 
Almost immediately, the aircraft came out the top of the 
overcast with the rudder-shaker (stall-warning device) shud- 
dering, indicating an impending stall. Fortunately, there 
was no weather above the fog bank and the aviator had time to 
cross check the gyro horizon with the visual horizon and to 
see that there was absolutely nothing wrong with the instru- 
ment. A relatively uneventful GCA was completed by a shaken, 
but much wiser aviator. 
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Since that aviator happens to be one of the authors of this re- 
port I he cannot help but wonder how many other neophyte aviators 
have naively written off a gyro as inoperative because they did 
not understand the mechanics of the instrument and/or its 
built-in safety features. Food for thought is how should a con- 
troller react to a pilot report that their gyro is "becoming 
unreliable?t, Or how do we educate the new GA aviator to heed his 
instruments and their operational indications? 
4. Other miscellaneous comments relative to vertigo related 
accidents not surprisingly included indications that the pilot 
lost control when making the transition from VFR to IFR condi- 
tions, was terminating an extended flight (12 hours in one case 
and 10 hours in another), and a case where the pilot was flying 
in night IFR conditions without having flown for six months. 
5. It is the opinion of the authors that the problem is 
most likely more severe than accident rates indicate. The basis 
for this statement is that weather conditions at the scene of the 
reported accidents had to be IFR (less than 1000 foot ceiling 
and/or less than 3 miles visibility) to be included in the repor- 
ted subset. One cannot help but wonder how many cases of vertigo 
end in a visual recovery beneath a cloud layer. 
Icing Caused Uncontrolled Collisions: After vertigo as a cause 
factor for SPIFR accidents involving pilot error comes icing. As 
can be seen in Table 36, icing is a primary cause factor in about 
one-third of the landing phase uncontrolled collisions and about 
17 percent of the enroute accidents of this type. The same set 
of variables as was discussed in the previous section on vertigo 
was examined to see if icing accidents might be related to speci- 
fic levels of pilot experience. The experience levels in general 
are much more evenly distributed for icing related uncontrolled 
collision, but the sample sizes are much smaller and consequently 
statistical inferences become less meaningful. 
Table 43 presents the experience level statistics for pilots 
involved in icing related uncontrolled collisions by landing and 
enroute phases. The statistics for the NASA GA pilot survey and 
overall SPIFR landing phase populations are repeated in Table 43 
for comparitive purposes. The reader is cautioned to note the 
sample sizes before assigning too much weight to the results. 
Table 44 is a summary of pilot experience levels for the 
SPIFR uncontrolled collisions in the landing phase which is 
structured for a comparison between vertigo and icing related 
mishaps. The impact of actual instrument and night time is dif- 
ficult to compare due to the large number of unreported amounts 
of night time in the icing area. Time in type and total flight 
hours appear to have relatively equal distributions with the 
icing incidents in general occurring to pilots with slightly more 
experience in both categories. 
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An interesting observation in the review of data was that 
only 2 of the 23 icing caused accidents involved single engine 
fixed gear aircraft as opposed to 9 of 26 vertigo landing acci- 
dents occurring in that aircraft class. Retractable gear single 
engine accounted for 9 icing incidents but only 5 vertigo inci- 
dents. Twin engine incidents were roughly the same with 11 icing 
and 10 vertigo incidents. As would be expected, the jet engine 
classes accounted for only 1 incident in each category which 
could in part be explained by the altitudes at which they cruise, 
the better instrumentation in the more expensive aircraft, and 
fewer aircraft in the GA community. Graphically, the breakdown 
of aircraft types was: 
Icing Vertigo 
Single Engine Fixed Gear 
Single Engine Retractable Gear 
Twin Engine Piston 
Turboprop/Jet 
A review of the icing uncontrolled collision accident briefs 
confirmed that the vast majority of the accidents were attributed 
to poor judgment of the pilot. In 18 of the 23 incidents, the 
weather was classified as "substantially the same as briefed." In 
two cases, it was classified as "considerably worse than briefed" 
but the pilot continued to press on in both situations with no 
de-icing equipment. 
In general, it appears that the severest of accidents caused 
by icing (i.e. uncontrolled collisions with the ground) are 
preventable mainly through pilot education and the development of 
low cost deicing equipment. 
Controlled Collisions: As was discussed in the introduction to 
this section, controlled collisions with the ground, trees, or 
other objects on the ground account for the largest single group 
of accidents in the SPIFR landing phase with pilot error as a 
factor. This section of the report explores the circumstances 
peculiar to various types of accidents within this group, concen- 
trating on the SPIFR night controlled collisions to isolate 
trends and/or pertinent contributory factors. The tables related 
to this section, 45 through 54, not only contain the data to sup- 
port the discussion in this section, but also contain some ampli- 
fying data that is not directly addressed. The latter are pro- 
vided so that others may conduct independent analysis of some of 
the relationships that the authors either judged as statistically 
unsupportable or that were not within the scope of the project. 
33 
Rather than presenting a broad brush analysis of all 
uncontrolled collisions and attempting to relate patterns between 
day, night, single pilot, and dual pilot operation, efforts were 
concentrated on determining in more detail what factors are the 
most germane and/or critical in night SPIFR uncontrolled colli- 
sions in the landing phase which involve pilot error. Based upon 
the results of the earlier NASA SPIFR report (reference A) along 
with the tables and discussion presented in this section of the 
report, it appears safe to assume that night SPIFR operations in 
the landing phase are the most demanding with which most general 
aviation pilots have to contend. Intuitively, it seems logical 
to assume that the problems faced in the night SPIFR instrument 
approach are simply an extension of the same evolution during day 
light. However, the fact that breaking out between layers of 
clouds and/or beneath an overcast at night does not provide a 
visual reference to lessen the pressures on the pilot demands 
higher levels of performance and concentration. Additional prob- 
lems with vertigo inducing aircraft and/or ground lighting re- 
flections in clouds as well as the problems associated with cock- 
pit lighting, trying to read an approach plate, dial in frequen- 
cies on poorly lit dials, etc. all contribute to higher physical 
and psychological demands at night. There are other factors such 
as the effects of darkness on depth perception and peripheral 
vision. Due to these burdens and complications, it seems logical 
that problems which may be simply an irritant or potential acci- 
dent cause in the day light should be magnified and easier'to 
detect in an analysis of night time operations. The serious day 
light problems should be all the more prevalent in the more de- 
manding night time environment. 
If the above assumptions are true, we might expect to find 
some of the same trends and patterns in daylight mishaps as we do 
at night, but the experience levels of the pilots involved in 
similar situations should be lower in daylight. i.e. The more 
demanding night environment will overcome higher experience 
levels that would keep a pilot out of trouble in daylight. Table 
45 presents a summary of the medians of various measures of pilot 
experience for SPIFR and DPIFR accidents that involved pilot er- 
ror in the landing phase of operations. Medians were used for 
the comparison to try to minimize the effect of the exceptionally 
high experience levels that bias the means. 
The results of Table 45 are by no means conclusive evidence 
that all of the assumptions made in the preceding two paragraphs 
are absolute truths. However, the indications are sufficient 
enough in the authors' opinions to justify a more in-depth analy- 
sis of the controlled collision at night in hopes of identifying 
significant problem areas. 
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SPIFR Night Controlled Collisions: There were 173 SPIFR lan- 
ding phase night controlled collisions involving pilot error in 
the NTSB data base for the period 1964-1979. Although the pro- 
portion of this type of accidents that occurred since 1975 is 3 
percent lower than that for the total set of SPIFR accidents con- 
sidered, the distribution of those accidents does not provide 
cause for optimism. During the years 1976 through 1979, the num- 
bers of SPIFR night controlled collisions were 6, 12, 21 and 23, 
respectively. Table 46 presents these numbers in terms of acci- 
dents per 1000 night approaches flown (from Table 31) and com- 
pares those rates to overall night SPIFR rates. Our earlier dis- 
cussion on day versus night rates indicated the night accident 
rate was increasing, and as can be seen in Table 46, the propor- 
tions of the night accidents that are classified as controlled 
collisions are also increasing. 
In an attempt to identify which factors are significant 
and/or inter-related, each night controlled collision accident 
brief was reviewed and a cause factor was assigned based upon a 
combination of the formal cause factor assigned by the accident 
investigator and a review of the secondary causes and investiga- 
tor comments. The cause factors into which all accidents were 
divided are: 
1. Improper IFR procedures 
2. Icing related 
43: 
Pilot distracted/diverted attention 
Suspect instruments misread 
5. Faulty instrument 
6. Descended below minimums 
7. Misjudged altitude 
;: 
Aircraft not properly equipped 
Did not fly published approach 
10. Conditions exceeded pilot's capabilities 
11. Pilot incapacitated 
12. Vertigo 
Subjective assignments to a category were necessary in some 
instances. For instance, if a plane crashed due to ice on the 
windshield because the windshield de-icers were inoperative, the 
incident could be assigned to either category 2 or 8. To facili- 
tate an analysis of the interaction of pilot experience and wea- 
ther conditions with cause factors, subjective classifications 
were made based upon which factor appeared to be of the most sig- 
nificance by the facts and comments in the accident brief. 
The right most columns of Table 47 provide a simple tabula- 
tion of all of the night controlled collisions by cause factor 
along with the way the accidents were distributed for the 1964- 
1975 and 1976-1979 time periods. There are four very significant 
changes in the data for the two time periods which are reflected 
in cause factor categories 3, 4, 6 and 10. (i.e. Distracted/Di- 
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verted Attention, Suspect Misread Instrument, Descended Below 
Minimums, and Pilot Exceeded Capabilities) Before addressing the 
significance of those changes, it should be mentioned that the 
major cause of the changes could relate to a combination of the 
way the accidents were classified and a possible change in NTSB 
investigator philosophies about comments on their accident brief. 
More specifically, practically all of the accidents reviewed were 
attributed to improper IFR procedures as the primary cause. If 
the comment section exlained the improper procedure or operation 
in terms such as the pilot momentarily being distracted or flying 
below minimums, that incident was classified in categories 3 or 
6, respectively. Thus, category 1 (Improper IFR Procedures) is 
more generic and was used when the brief lacked secondary causes 
and comments. 
In light of the cause factor classification methodology, 
we can only speculate about the large changes in categories 3, 4, 
6 and 10. Using the most conservative approach, let us hypothe- 
size that trends remained constant after 1975, and that those 
accidents that were caused by one of the four categories (3, 4, 6 
or 10) simply were not so annotated in the comments section by 
the investigator. If our hypothesis is correct, the sums of cat- 
egories 1, 3, 4, 6 and 10 for the two time periods should have a 
ratio similar to the ratio for the total accidents for the same 
periods, assuming also that trends have continued unchanged. In 
fact, the ratios are .339 and .358 for the sums and totals, re- 
spectively. The acceptance range at a confidence level of 95 
percent for the overall proportional occurrences of accidents is 
.25 to .42. Since .358 falls well inside of this range, indica- 
tions are that,there has been no change in the relative number of 
occurrences of the combined categories. To identify if any actu- 
al trends are actually occurring in the causes of night con- 
trolled collisions, and to relate those trends to pilot charac- 
teristics, the cause factors in question were re-examined and 
then regrouped to allow for the probable change in the accident 
brief comments. (i.e. The reticence of investigators in later 
years to include remarks about the pilot continuing below mini- 
mums.) 
The four categories 3, 4, 6 and 10 (distracted/diverted 
attention, suspect misread instruments, descended below minimums, 
and pilot exceeded capability) all lend themselves to speculative 
comments after an aircraft has crashed in below minimums weather, 
especially if there are no indications of mechanical or other 
human failure. Therefore, two additional tests were made to gain 
more information on the change in the number of accidents attri- 
buted to "descending below minimums". The first test involved 
relating the occurrences of this group of causes to accidents 
where the weather was known to be below minimums and the second 
test was made relative to fatal accidents. 
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There were 31 accidents in the 1964-.I975 period that occur- 
red in below minimums weather and 11 in the 1976-1979 period. 
Table 47 presents a breakdown of the accidents that occurred be- 
low minimums in each time period for each of the cause factors. 
If the occurrences in categories 3, 4, 6, IO are assumed to be 
based upon conjecture of the investigator and are all summed into 
the generic group (I) of improper IFR procedures, the ratio of 
Improper IFR Procedure accidents in 1976-1979 is 8/11 or .73. 
Based upon the population of 42 accidents, we find that the over- 
all proportion of 35/42 or .83 is within a 95 percent confidence 
interval (.47-.qq). 
Applying the same logic and methodology to the fatal night 
collisions which are also presented in Table 47, we have a popu- 
lation of 85 and a ratio for our group of categories 3, 4, 6, 10 
of 21/34 or .62 for the later time period. The overall ratio for 
the fatal accidents for the two time periods is 58/85 or .68 and 
falls well within the 95 percent confidence interval range of 
0.45 to .78. 
Based upon the results of these two tests, the probability 
that a change in reporting procedures could be the cause for the 
apparent shift of accident causes for those accidents that occur 
in below minimums weather as well as in the case of fatal acci- 
dents falls well within a 95 percent confidence interval. In 
other words, we cannot say the shift is not due solely to repor- 
ting procedures. 
To reflect cause factor trends in more of an operational 
context, the cause factor list was regrouped as follows: 
1. Improper IFR Procedure - Includes distracted/ 
diverted attention, suspect instruments mis- 
read, descended below minimums, and pilot did 
not fly published approach. 
2. Aircraft Not Properly Equipped - Includes 
faulty instruments and lack of proper de-icing 
equipment. 
3. Misjudged Altitude - A unique category of pilot 
error that occurs after visual contact is made. 
4. Pilot Incapacitated - The total population of 5 
includes heart attack, hypoxia, and vertigo. 
Essentially the groups represent human error in instrument condi- 
tions, mechanical error, human error in visual conditions, and an 
act of God. Table 48 simply confirms that the period of 1976 
through 1979 has not undergone any significant changes in cause 
factor patterns. Pilots continue to fly into the ground at night 
and the vast majority of such mishaps (71 percent in 1976-1979) 
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remain attributable to improper IFR procedures which cover a wide 
variety of sins. Although there appears to have been a major 
shift in accident reporting procedures, the actual causes do not 
appear to have changed significantly any from the 1964-1975 peri- 
od. It is difficult to say for sure that descending below mini- 
mums continues as the leading element within the improper proce- 
dures category. However, based upon the fact that to contact the 
ground, a pilot would have to descend below minimums when the 
weather is below minimums, and since 5 accidents in those condi- 
tions were attributed solely to improper procedure (Table 47), it 
is fairly safe to assume that such was the case. 
Pilot Experience vs Night/Day Controlled Collisions: Table 49 
wafthe number of nTght-controlled collisions 
in terms of various measures of a pilot's proficiency or experi- 
ence. Table 50 provides the same data for day controlled colli- 
sions. Table 51 presents a combination of 49 and 50 in percen- 
tages of accidents reported. There are many nuances in the data 
presented in these particular tables about which one could do a 
great deal of speculating. The reader is cautioned to pay parti- 
cular attention to the range of hours covered by each of the bins 
before drawing any hasty conclusions. Table 46 and 47 present 
the first 100 hours of experience in 4 bins to see how the 
figures on the very inexperienced pilot behave, and at the high 
end of the tables, figures include thousands of hours. Two 
points the authors of this report felt worthy of comments are: 
1. Simulated Instrument Experience: As shown in Table 51, 
85 percent of the night uncontrolled collisions upon 
which simulated instrument time was reported fell in the 
O-100 hours bin as did 73 percent of the day mishaps. 
Within that 100 hours, both day and night accident rates 
peaked out in the 40 to 60 hour bracket. In Table 52, 
which presents a comparison of pilot profiles for day and 
night uncontrolled collisions, it can be seen that the 
median simulated times for pilots involved in day and 
night uncontrolled collisions are equal at 59. This is 
down slightly from the entire SPIFR data base, and down 
significantly for the "typical GA pilot,, derived from the 
GA survey data base. Even though the relationship of 
simulated hours to uncontrolled collision rates is not 
that far out of line from the GA profile, it appears as 
though the hours of simulated instruments is dispropor- 
tionately small when compared to actual actual instrument 
hours. 
Table 53 was compiled to compare simulated instrument ex- 
perience with aircraft types. The authors hypothesized 
that perhaps the small single engine aircraft would skew 
the distribution of simulated hours possibly due to many 
solo flights and/or the passenger seat(s) not situated 
well for look-out purposes. As can be seen in Table 53, 
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2. 
twin engine pilots, in general, did not have any more 
simulated time than the single engine pilots.. 
Time in Type for Single Engine versus Twin Engine: Ac- 
cording to the data in Reference C, 70.5 percent of the 
GA pilots fly in single engine aircraft as IFR pilots. 
Over the 16 years represented in the NTSB data, 151 of 
the 239 controlled collisions occurred in twin engine 
aircraft. That means that twin aircraft (includes turbo- 
prop) accounted for 63.2 percent of this type of SPIFR 
mishap, or rephrased 29.5 percent of the aircraft account 
for 63.2 percent of the controlled collisions attribu- 
ted to pilot factor in the landing phase. Upon arriving 
at this percentage, the authors hypothesized that this 
was attributable to the higher workload demanded from the 
SPIFR pilot in twins as suggested by the previous NASA 
research. (Reference A) If this were the'case, one 
would expect the accident rate at night to be higher than 
in the day, particularly if our earlier hypothesis on 
night demands being an important factor in higher rates 
holds true. 
Interestingly, the proportion of twin controlled colli- 
sion accidents decreases at night. Whether the propor- 
tion changes due to relatively more single engine acci- 
dents at night or due to less twin accidents is not 
clear, but the figures are consistent. The proportion of 
controlled collisions that occurred in single and twin 
engine aircraft is as shown below in Table 54. The 
Table 54. Proportion of Twin Uncontrolled 
Collisions 
1964-1979 1976-1979 
Twin Day/All Day -71 -72 
Twin Night/All Night .60 .61 
proportion of overall accidents in all phases and all 
light conditions for twins was demonstrated to be .62. 
Table 55 presents the distribution of the time in type 
for experience levels for day and night controlled colli- 
sions by single and twin engine aircraft. There is a 
definite increase in the proportion of single engine mis- 
haps at experience levels of less than 100 hours and the 
distribution of time in type for twins remains fairly 
consistent from day to night. However the best we can do 
is speculate that the apparent decrease in the overall 
ratio of night twin engine mishaps is due more to an in- 
crease in inexperienced pilots in single engine mishaps. 
(Based upon the proportions of single and twin day acci- 
dents, computing 95 percent confidence intervals against 
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which to check the night proportions give us ranges of 
.60 to .82 and .18 to .40 for the respective proportions 
of .60 and .39 which does not help in the determination 
of which has what impact.) 
Visibility in Controlled Collisions: Table 56 presents a sum- 
mary of the reported visibility broken down for day and night 
single and dual piloted controlled collision accidents. The 
first four rows of the table present the absolute number of acci- 
dents for each reported visibility while the bottom four rows 
tabulate the occurrences by percentages. Except for day dual 
piloted accidents, the percentage of accidents that occur when 
the existing visibility is 2 miles is greater than the number 
that occur with 1 mile reported visibility. The cumulative num- 
ber that occur with less than one mile visibility approaches 50 
percent for all of the categories except night SPIFR controlled 
collisions. The latter happen most frequently with 1 to 2 miles 
visibility as do night DPIFR mishaps. 
In an attempt to establish a relationship between the crash 
site and the location of the airport, a table was compiled to see 
how many controlled collisions occur within sight of the destina- 
tion airport. Table 57 provides a comparison of the number of 
day and night SPIFR accidents where the visibility is greater or 
less than the distance of the crash from the airport. One would 
logically expect relatively few pilots to fly into the ground if 
the airport were in sight. When the visibility is less than 1 
mile, 28 percent of day and 31 percent of night controlled colli- 
sions occur with the distance of the crash from the airport being 
less than the visibility, i.e., within visual range of the air- 
port. At visibilities of 1 mile and greater, 57 percent of the 
day and 62 percent of the night controlled collisions occur with- 
in theoretical sight of the airport. 
The reasons for flying into the ground with the airport in 
sight are explainable in some instances where there was icing 
involved or the pilot misjudged his altitude after transitioning 
to visual flight. Other possibilities may be gleened from table 
58 which presents a matrix of accident causes and approach types 
for night controlled collisions. 
A possible contributing factor to those occurrences where 
the aircraft is within visual range of the airport could be the 
type of lighting for night instrument approaches. Unfortunately, 
few accident reports contained data on lighting. Seventy-one 
accidents after 1975 included runway lighting information. The 
data prior to 1975 were discarded since if lighting data were 
included at all, they included only the intensity of the lights 
and not the type. None of the reports included data on approach 
lighting. The only correlation that could be made for certain 
about the effects of runway lighting is when it was a cause fac- 
tor. There were two cases where the pilot could not or failed to 
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actuate the pilot actuated runway lights, 3 cases of the aircraft 
crashing into the lights, and 2 cases where the lights were 
covered by a snow bank. Of the 15 aircraft that flew into trees 
and had reports that included data on the runway lights, 8 were 
outside of visual range of the airport, and of the rest, only 3 
aircraft unexplainably flew into the trees with no influencing 
factor such as icing or the pilot misjudging his altitude. One 
of the 3 had medium intensity runway lights in addition to high 
intensity. The remaining two had high intensity lighting only. 
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CLOSING COMMENTS 
Ideally, one would like to close a report with a list of im- 
portant conclusions and recommendations. However, the authors 
feel that the nature of the results of this analysis do not lend 
themselves to objective stand-alone.statements. This report cov- 
ers a wide range of topics, and has identified many factors and 
experience traits that are indicative of trends and/or patterns 
which relate to accident types and causes. However, we feel that 
the reader should interpret identified trends and factors within 
the context of the analysis and related topics with which they 
are presented. The following paragraphs present some of the gen- 
eral findings of this effort. 
Of the 554 SPIFR pilot error landing accidents which were 
analyzed in detail, 39 percent occurred after Reference A was 
published. However, there were no significant changes from the 
original findings in the relationships of mission variables to 
the accidents in the later time period. The absolute number of 
accidents is increasing but when compared to the higher numbers 
of activity, the rate is decreasing. Worthy of note is the fact 
that this accident rate over the last four years of data has been 
decreasing more slowly. (i.e. The overall picture is brighter 
each year but the gains being made are smaller.) 
In an analysis of these accidents by phase of landing, it 
was found that there were statistically fewer accidents in the 
the initial approach phase after 1975 which is most likely attri- 
butable to fewer non-precision approaches being flown. The final 
approach phase still accounts for most landing phase SPIFR acci- 
dents with three times as many occurring at night as do in the 
daylight. 
The fact that so many more final approach accidents occur 
at night rather than in the daylight led to a concerted effort to 
quantify day and night accident rates. The aviation community 
has long known that the number of accidents that occur during day 
and night has been about the same over the years. However, it 
was found that 87.6 percent of GA activity occurs during daylight 
and 12.4 percent in darkness. The startling conclusion of this 
report is that the night accident rates for both single and dual 
piloted aircraft are over 10 times greater than the day rates. 
Statistical profiles were compiled for the typical GA pilot 
in the NASA Survey and the typical pilot involved in the 554 ac- 
cidents analyzed. These profiles were compared to profiles of 
the pilots involved in sub-sets of accidents to determine the 
importance of experience levels. Essentially, these efforts 
ended up documenting the intuitive assumption that the lesser 
experienced pilot is more likely to be involved in a SPIFR pilot 
error accident. The degree to which this is true was especially 
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significant in the analysis of vertigo related uncontrolled col- 
lisions with the ground, and not as important to icing related 
accidents. In the case of the latter, a low cost reliable anti- 
icing or deicing device appears to be needed in the GA community. 
Throughout the report, many subjects are discussed which 
lend themselves to further analysis and speculation. The authors 
sincerely hope that the efforts represented on these pages pro- 
vide seeds for future research which will help reduce the GA ac- 
cident rate. Two general areas which are suggested for closer 
scrutinization are: 
1. The impact of simulated instrument time upon the likeli- 
hood of a SPIFR accident. Specifically, one would very 
much like to know how much impact reporting procedures in 
the NTSB accident briefs effect the statistics discussed 
in this report relating to simulated instrument time. 
Why are the levels of simulated instrument time that ap- 
pear for the SPIFR pilots in the NTSB data base and the 
NASA single pilot GA survey as diverse as they are? 
2. The disparity between day and night SPIFR accident rates. 
Out of 5,416 SPVFR accidents from 1964 to 1975 which in- 
volved pilot error, only 14 percent occurred at night. 
Based upon our estimate of night time activity (12.8 per- 
cent of overall activity) derived from the IfGeneral Avia- 
tion Pilot and Aircraft Activity Surveyl', it appears that 
SPVFR accident rates are unaffected by the condition of 
light while SPIFR approach/landing phase accident rates 
are magnified by 10 fold. 
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National Transportation Safety Board general aviation (GA) aircraft 
accident data for the years 1964 to 1979 were examined for single pilot 
instrument flight rule (SPIFR) accidents caused by pilot error. The 1396 
accidents found were analysed to determine the relationship of SPIFR accident 
types to phase of flight, pilot experience, and mission variables such as 
condition of light,ceiling, visibility, and type of approach. An estimate 
of GA day and night activity was made in order to estimate actual day and 
night accident rates. 
The results of the data analysis indicate that about 50 percent of the 
SPIFR accidents occurred during the landing phase of flight, 40 percent 
occurred during the enroute phase, and 10 percent occurred during the taxi/ 
takeoff phases. Fog was present in 72 percent of the landing phase accidents 
and of those accidents 54 percent occurred in visibilities of 1 mile or less. 
Experienced pilots tended to have a lower accident rate than less 
experienced pilots. This trend was expecially significant with vertigo related 
accidents and much less significant with icing related accidents. 
The estimate of day GA activity was 87.6 percent of all GA activity and 
night activity was 12.4 percent. Based on these estimates and the number of 
day and night accidents the night accident rate was judged to be 10 times the 
day accident rate. 
When approach types were examined 33 percent of the landing phase accidents 
occurred during VOR or VOR/DME approaches, 8 percent occurred during NDB 
approaches. Over twice as many accidents occurred during straight in ILS 
approaches with no radar advisories available as during straight in ILS approaches 
with radar advisories. 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLES 6-58 
TABLE 6 
SPIFR LANDING ACCIDENTS IN TERMS OF OBSTRUCTION TO VISION 
AT THE ACCIDENT SITE AND SELECTED MISSION VARIABLES 
OBSTRUCTION 
TOTAL 398 
INJURY INDEX 
NONE 108 
MINOR 
SERIOUS 5'; 
FATAL 183 
VISIBILITY 
ZERO 
l/4 MILE 
l/2 MILE 
3/4 MILE 
1 MILE 
2 MILES 
3 MILES 
4 MILES 
11 
2 
ii2 
112 
52 
10 
PRECIPITATION 
RAIN/DRIZZLE 
SNOW 
FREEZING RAIN 
AND DRIZZLE 
OTHER (INCL NONE) 
161 
23 
29 
185 
TERRAIN 
MOUNTAINS 
HILLY 
ROLLING 
LEVEL 
DENSE W/TREES 
: 2 
5 1 
2 ~ 4' 1 
1 j 
7 6 ; 
I 
10 
24 2 
1 1 
17 :, 21 
1 3 
2 2 
ii 4 1 l 
1 4 
36 
9’ 
184 
E 
16 I 222 
1 
2 
z 
5 
10 
4 
2 
3 35 
27 256 z; 
192 
71 ;7’ 
2: 42 18 
2 tg 
86 23 
TABLE 7 
SPIFR LANDING ACCIDENTS IN TERMS OF CONDITION OF LIGHT 
AND SELECTED MISSION VARIABLES 
DAWN DAY DUSK DARK TOTAL 
TOTAL 
INJURY INDEX 
NONE 
MINOR 
SERIOUS 
FATAL 
VISIBILITY 
ZERO 
l/4 MILE 
l/2 MILE 
3/4 MILE 
1 MILE 
2 MILES 
3 MILES 
OVER 4 MILES 
OBSTRUCT. TO VISION 
FOG 
NONE 
PRECIPITATION 
RAIN & DRIZZLE 
SNOW 
FREEZING RAIN 
OTHER 
TERRAIN 
MOUNTAINS 
HILLY 
ROLLING 
LEVEL 
DENSE W/TREES 
PERCENT 
1976-79 
10 223 27 294 554 39 
2 
22 
76 
12 
z 
8 
69 
45 
47 
133 
184 
8; 
222 
38 
44 
E 
1: 
13 
2 
64 
3: 
32 
li 
70 
40 
43 
16 
54 
48 
;: 
143 
71 
77 
t; 
29 
42 
34 
40 
z; 
8 154 20 216 398 40 
1 30 3 32 66 39 
81 
33 
if 
10 
4 
1 
12 
99 
34 
1:; 
192 
71 
2% 
36 
46 
:; 
4 
3 
19 
14 
18 
196 
9 
25 
31 
:; 
84 
86 
42 
:; 
43 
TABLE 8 
SPIFR LANDING ACCIDENTS IN TERMS OF PHASE OF LANDING 
AND SELECTED MISSION VARIABLES 
GO 
AROUND 
VFR 
PERCENT 
1976-79 
\ 
-.\ PHASE OF .._ FLIGHI 
\ MISSION 
VARIABLES 
\ 
TOTAL 
TRAFFIC 
PATTERN 
CIRCLING 
VL OFF 
TOUCH- 
DOWN 
FINAL 
VFR 
'INAL 
IFR 
INITIAL 
IFR 
MISSED 
APPRCH ROLL OTHER TOTAL 
26 224 
26 
34 
40 
124 
3: 
25 
z-: 
52 
27 
16 
16 554 
184 
E 
222 
16 
5: 
;"6 
143 
71 
77 
8 
53 
25 
84 
16 
5 
2 
E 
38 
40 
INJURY INDEX 
NONE 
MINOR 
SERIOUS 
FATAL 
42 
4 
10 
6 
11 
48 
: 
8 
7 
10 
14 
9 
14 
1 
2 
11 
1 
1 
1 
: 
; 
2 
VISIBILITY 
ZERO 
l/4 MILE 
62 
43 
c; 
43; 
E 
2 
14 
44 
14 
18 
1 
1 
93 
16 
z 
l/2 MILE 
3/4 MILE 
1 MILE 
2 MILES 
3 MILES 
OVER 4 MILES 
COND. OF LIGHT 
NIGHT 
DAY 
DUSK & DAWN 
160 
53 
11 
20 
23 
3 
294 ) 39 
223 ~ 41 
40 / 38 
17 
20 
4 
36 
1 
8 
4 
61 
19 
OBSTRUCT. TO VIS. 
FOG 
NONE 
TERRAIN 
MOUNTAINS 
HILLY 
ROLLING 
LEVEL 
DENSE W/TREES 
BELOW MINS 
191 
12 
12 
23 
24 
:; 
60 
13 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
ti 42 20
2 4': 
86 23 
6 
TABLE 9 
SPIFR LANDING ACCIDENTS AND RATIOS RELATING TO 
TO PHASE OF INSTRUMENT APPROACH 
PHASE OF FINAL INITIAL MISSED PATTRN LEVEL ROLL FINAL GO-RND OTHER TOTAL 
FLIGHT IFR IFR APPR CIRC TCHDWN VFR VFR 
TOTALS 
1964-1975" 139 59 20 7 59 27 16 7 335 
1964-1979 224 75 41 16 107 46 26 : 14 554 
PROPORTION OC- 
CURRED 1964-79 -38 .21 -51 956 .45 .41 -38 .80 l 50 -39 
NIGHT/DAY 
1964-1975 3.30 1.20 .42 -75 -36 6.50 1.00 0.00 2.00 1.40 
m 1964-1979 3.00 1 .oo .85 -78 -38 -87 1.40 4.00 3*30 1.30 
A I 
NOTE: Data extracted from original NASA SPIFR study (reference A) 
TABLE 10 
ACCIDENTS IN TERMS OF TYPE OF APPROACH EXECUTED 
AND SELECTED MISSION VARIABLES 
SPIFR LANDING 
-f PRECISION I NON-PRECISION 1 
STRAIGHT-IN IICIRCLING I STRAIGHT-IN CIRCLING 
? A- 
l- 
PAR hLS ILS (ILS 
I DNLY'/ASR ONLYi/ASR 
ILS hOR 
0NLY:ONL 
IOR 
'DMI 
IDB 
INL! 
.oc r1.S ' OTH 
)NLI - - 
~LNK /TOT % 
'6-71 
16 
+- 104 5 ] 6 75 -- 
--r---l ' 
12 
- 
3 
2 
: 
31 - 
ii 
3 
17 
10 
I 
6) 36 TOTAL 
INJURY INDEX 
NONE 
MINOR 
SERIOUS 
FATAL 
15 
5" 
22 
9 
6 
2 
19 
75 
13 
14 
.l 9 
la4 
2 
222 
2 21 
6 
10 28 
a 
I7 
17 
14 
5 2 
2 1 
2: : , ;; 34 j 45 
VISIBILITY 
ZERO 
l/4 MILE 
l/2 MILE 
3/4 MILE 
1 MILE 
2 MILES 
3 MILES 
OVER 4 MILES 
I 
2 
1 
2 2 
2 1 
1 
: 3 
1 
7 3 
1 
12 
2 
1 
4 1 
1 
: 1 
1 
1 1 
I 
'I 2 
2 
i : 
2 
4 2 
: 1 
15 
' a8 13 i 
11 
5 13 
'13 22 
1 12 20 
A- 
10 
1 : 9 
i !l 
1: 1 I :: 
: / 1 
1 ! 
', 
12 6
I 
3 1 20 
11 
1 ! 
10 
11 
: 
; 
9 
15 
11 
3 
2 
6' 
: 
12 
53 
I- 
i ,- 
1 
I- 
2, 41 
3' 31 
1' 3 1 
COND. OF LIGHT 
NIGHT 
DAY 
DUSK/DAWN 
294 
223 
37 
39 
:: 
3 
1 
1 
23 
7 
1 
2 
1 
- 
7 
1 
- 
1 
9 
22 
23 
3 
40 65 
2 17 28 
~ 2 11 
2 42 85 
a, 11 
16 
10 22 
1 
1 :i f : 
1 3; :8" 
7 12 
16 8 
5 
: 5 
7 I: 4 
J- 
OBS. TO VISION 
FOG 
NONE 
4 
- 
1 
4 
13 ‘0 
2 1 
2 1 
; 
2 
9 : 
i 
i : 
3 3 
1 
1 2 
: 
1 67 
26 - 
3 
12 
do” 
1 
1 7' 
3 
4 24 
2 
t 
19 
l5 
1 
s 
1 2 
9 
1 
- 
: 
2 
25 
1 - 
53 
6 
17 
34 
1 
:: 
4”: 
TERRAIN 
MOUNTAINS 
HILLY/ROLLING 
LEVEL 
OTHERS 
83 
2: 
PHASE OF LANDIN 
INITIAL 
FINAL IFR 
LEVELOFF 
TRAFFIC PTRN 
MISSED APP. 
ROLL 
OTHER 
7 
17 
3 
: 
1 
2: 
55 
2 
2 
7 
11 
10 
42 
5 
9 
26 
18 
75 
!24 
107 
16 
2 
45 
TABLE 11 
SPIFR LANDING ACCIDENTS AND ACCIDENT RATES 
IN TERMS OF PILOT'S TOTAL TIME 
, 
TOTAL 
FLIGHT HRS 200-399 400-599 600-999 lK-1.9K 2K-2.9K 3K-4.9K 5K-9.9K IO-15K >15K TOTAL 
NO. OF ACCIDENTS 
1964-1979 35 40 57 113 82 94 77 34 20 552 
NO. OF ACCIDENTS 
1976-1979 18 16 22 53 31 31 28 13 6 218 
CL' 
b PERCENT OCCURRED 
1976-1975 -51 .40 039 l 47 -38 -33 -36 -38 l 30 -39 
IFR RATED PILOTS 
AS OF 12/31/79 15852 23303 34400 49460 30437 32927 38522 12682 11255 248838 
j;;E:":::,,"4:,, 1 .074 1 .034 / .021 1 .015 .Oll .007 J -003 1 -002 1 -001 1; 
NOTE: 7769 Pilots not categorized to accomodate non-respondents and 
those with less than 200 hours. 
TABLE 12 
SPIFR LANDING ACCIDENTS AND ACCIDENT RATES 
IN TERMS OF PILOT'S ACTUAL INSTRUMENT TIME 
* 
ACTUAL I 
INST. HRS 01-29 30-59 60-99 100-199 200-299 300-599 >599 TOTAL 
NO. OF ACCIDENTS 
1964-1979 70 36 37 71 54 51 52 371 
NO. OF ACCIDENTS 
1976-1979 26 16 19 25 18 19 15 138 
1 PERCENT OCCURRED F9i'6-1979 -37 .44 .53 -35 .33 .37 l 29 l 37 
IFR RATED PILOTS 
AS OF 12/31/79 57704 43118 13000 41535 24732 31071 21718 232878 
ACCIDENT RATE 
(PER 10000 HRS) .809 .I88 .358 .I14 .088 -037 .028 
NOTE: 23779 Pilots not categorized to accomodate non-respondents. 
TABLE 13 
SPIFR LANDING ACCIDENTS AND ACCIDENT RATES 
IN TERMS OF PILOT TIME IN THE PAST 90 DAYS 
NO. OF ACCIDENTS 
1976-1979 
O-24 25-49 50-99 100-149 150-199 200-299 >300 TOTAL 
73 95 112 65 I I 38 48 16 447 
34 46 48 22 16 18 4 188 
!i PERCENT OCCURRED 
1976-1979 -47 .48 
I I 
IFR RATED PILOTS 
AS OF 12/31/79 68320 58334 52627 26314 / 19814 1 17595 1 2853 1 245878 
ACCIDENT RATE 
(PER 10000 HRS) -85 l 43 029 
-43 l 34 .42 037 -25 .42 
.20 / .ll 1 l ll 1 014 1 
NOTE: 10779 Pilots not categorized to accomodate non-respondents. 
TABLE 14 
SPIFR LANDING ACCIDENTS IN TERMS OF 
PILOT'S TIME IN TYPE OF AIRCRAFT 
I 
TIME IN TYPE (HRS) O-19 20-49 50-99 100-299 300-600 >600 ' TOTAL 
NO. OF ACCIDENTS 
1964-1979 29 51 49 122 103 137 491 
NO. OF ACCIDENTS 
1976-1979 9 19 22 55 32 58 195 
PERCENT OCCURRED 
1976-1979 031 -37 -45 045 031 .42 
1. 
TABLE 16 
ACTUAL INSTRUMENT TIME: EXPERIENCE LEVELS OF NASA SURVEY RESPONDEES 
VERSUS PILOTS INVOLVED IN SPIFR ACCIDENTS 
ACTUAL INSTRUMENT 
HOURS I-19 m-39 40-59 60-79 80-99 loo-199 200-299 3oo-399 400-799 >799 TOTAL 
SURVEY 
RESPONSES 236 195 164 75 48 262 156 88 151 94 1469 
PERCENTAGES 16 13 11 5 3 18 11 6 10 6 
SPIFR ACCIDENTS 
TOTAL NUMBER 51 34 21 21 16 71 54 22 42 39 371 
PERCENTAGES 14 9 6 6 4 19 15 6 11 11 I 
TABLE 18 
SIMULATED INSTRUMENT TIME: EXPERIENCE LEVELS OF NASA SURVEY RESPONDEES 
VERSUS PILOTS INVOLVED IN SPIFR ACCIDENTS 
SIMULATED INSTRUMENT I 
HOURS l-19 20-39 40-59 60-79 80-99 loo-199 200-299 300-399 400-799 >799 ; TOTAL 
SURVEY 
RESPONSES 63 155 328 232 93 284 116 55 66 47 1439 
PERCENTAGES 4 11 23 16 7 20 8 4 5 3 
Y 
2 
SPIFR ACCIDENTS 
TOTAL NUMBER 26 35 80 59 34 36 10 4 7 3 294 
I 
PERCENTAGES 9 12 27 20 12 12 3 1 2 1 
TABLE 20 
TOTAL PILOT TIME LAST 90 DAYS: EXPERIENCE LEVELS OF NASA SURVEY RESPONDEES 
VERSUS PILOTS INVOLVED IN SPIFR ACCIDENTS 
PILOT 90 DAY TOTAL 
TIME 1-14 15-29 30-44 45-59 60-74 75-99 loo-124 125-224 225-324 >324 TOTAL 
SURVEY 
RESPONSES 283 319 188 130 83 128 99 238 72 11 1551 
PERCENTAGES 18 21 12 
I 
8 5 8 6 
I 
15 5 1 
7 2 
r" SPIFR ACCIDENTS 
TOTAL NUMBER 24 74 55 33 44 50 42 75 41 9 447 
I PERCENTAGES 5 17 12 7 10 11 9 17 9 2 
I 
I 
TABLE 22 
TOTAL PILOT TIME: EXPERIENCE LEVELS OF NASA SURVEY RESPONDEES 
VERSUS PILOTS INVOLVED IN SPIFR ACCIDENTS 
I 
PILOT TOTAL 
49; 
500- ; IK- 4K- 6K- 
7.9K l;:;K 
12K- >15.9K TOTAL 
TIME 999 1.4K 5.9K 15.9K 
SURVEY 
RESPONSES 180 292 161 151 329 147 113 87 63 55 1578 
PERCENTAGES 11 19 10 10 21 9 7 6 4 4 
P 
2 
SPIFR ACCIDENTS 
TOTAL NUMBER 53 77 63 47 144 66 32 30 20 17 549 
PERCENTAGES 10 14 12 9 26 12 6 5 4 3 
TABLE 23 
SPIFR LANDING ACCIDENT TYPE VS AIRCRAFT TYPE 
I 
SINGLE ENGINE SINGLE ENGINE TWIN ENGINE TURBO-PROP TOTAL 
FIXED GEAR RETRACT. GEAR PISTON 
ACCIDENT TYPES: 
GROUND/WATER LOOP/SWERVE 6 2 20 1 29 
WHEELS UP 0 6 9 2 17 
GEAR COLLAPSED 1 0 4 2 7 
GEAR RETRACTED 0 3 3 0 6 
HARD LANDING 4 7 26 3 40 
Y 
NOSE OVER/DOWN 3 0 0 0 3 
E OVERSHOOT 9 1 21 0 31 
UNDERSHOOT 2 3 16 0 21 
I 
CONTROLLED COLLISION 37 61 144 13 255 
UNCONTROLLED COLLISION 10 13 17 0 40 
STALL 4 14 27 3 48 
ENG FAIL OR MALFUNCTION 11 9 29 2 51 
OTHER 0 4 2 0 6 
TOTAL 87 123 318 26 554 
I 
TABLE 26 
SPIFR LANDING ACCIDENT TYPE VS SINGLE OR DUAL PILOTED 
TOTAL ACCIDENTS 
SINGLE PILOT 
ACCIDENT TYPES: 
I 
I 
GROUND/WATER LOOP/SWERVE j 
I WHEELS UP 
I GEAR COLLAPSED I 7 I 3 
I 
1 i 2 I 
GEAR RETRACTED 6 0 
HARD LANDING 40 14 
P 
E NOSE OVER/DOWN 3 2 
OVERSHOOT 31 12 
- 
UNDERSHOOT 21 13 
I CONTROLLED COLLISION 255 74 
UNCONTROLLED COLLISION 40 9 7 5 
48 17 9 10 
ENG FAIL OR MALFUNCTION 51 12 9 7 
OTHER 6 3 1 1 
TOTAL 554 179 
- 1 
TABLE 31 
SINGLE PILOT LANDING PHASE ACCIDENT RATES IN TERMS OF 
ACCIDENTS PER 1000 INSTRUMENT APPROACHES FLOWN 
ACCIDENTS APPROACHES ACCIDENT RATE 
YEAR: TOTAL DAY NIGHT TOTAL DAY NIGHT TOTAL DAY NIGHT 
1964 9 2 7 148760 129373 19387 .061 .015 .361 
1965 9 2 7 190910 166030 24880 .047 .012 .281 
1966 16 7 9 235135 204492 30643 .068 .034 .294 
1967 17 6 11 28290 1 246033 36868 ,060 .024 .298 
1968 15 8 7 339266 295053 44213 .044 .027 -158 
1969 27 12 15 423288 368125 55163 .064 DO33 .272 I 
I 
1970 34 17 17 439212 382061 57251 .077 .044 -297 ' 
1971 29 16 13 458095 399699 58396 .063 .041 ,223 
. 1972 49 19 30 572669 499599 73070 .086 -039 .411 
1973 35 13 22 625880 544419 81461 .056 .024 .270 
1974 36 17 19 666440 579740 86700 .054 .029 .219 
1975 40 17 23 695592 604861 90731 -058 .028 -253 
1976 31 16 15 635921 553049 82872 .049 .029 .181 
- 
1977 47 20 27 725730 631318 94412 .065 ,031 .286 
1978 56 19 37 908117 789015 119102 .062 .024 .311 
1979 72 37 35 1023700 889576 134124 .070 .042 .261 
TOTAL 522 228 294 8371716 7282443 1089273 .062 .031 .270 
1 
TABLE 32 
DUAL PILOT LANDING PHASE ACCIDENT RATES IN TERMS OF 
ACCIDENTS PER 1000 INSTRUMENT APPROACHES FLOWN 
ACCIDENTS 
TABLE 33 
RATIOS OF DAY TO NIGHT ACCIDENT RATES FOR 
SPIFR AND DPIFR LANDING PHASE ACCIDENTS 
YEAR SP(D)/DP(D) SP(N)/DP(N) SP(N)/SP(D) DP(N)/DP(D) ALL(N)/ALL(D) 
- 
1964 .75 054 24.1 33.1 26.2 
1965 2.73 23.4 25.6 
1966 1.36 1.75 8.6 6.7 8.9 
1967 1.14 4.26 12.4 3.3 10.2 
1968 1 I .59 -39 5.8 23.9 9*4 
1969 ~ 1.57 1.17 8.2 11.1 9.0 
1970 .66 .82 6.7 5.3 6.1 
r 1971 1.02 -63 5.4 8.8 co 
6-3 
1972 -83 1.95 10.5 4.5 8.6 
1973 11 -73 2.14 I 1.1.2 3.8 I 8.8 
1974 2.23 1.23 7.5 13.7 8.3 
1975 I-33 -99 9.0 12.1 9-8 
1976 1.53 2.92 I 6.2 3*3 5.6 
f977 1.55 1.75 9.2 8.1 9.0 
1978 .49 2.41 12.9 2.6 8.4 
1979 2.10 1.06 6.2 12.3 6.9 
MEAN 1.26 1.67 10.5 10.2 10.4 
* 
z 
W 
TABLE 34 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION LINE SLOPES AND R-SQUARED VALUES FOR 
DAY AND NIGHT ACCIDENT RATES IN TERMS OF 1000 APPROACHES 
ALL YEARS 1964-1975 
SLOPE R-SQUARED 1 SLOPE 
1 I 
SPIFR DAY ACCIDENTS 
PER 1000 APPROACHES .OOl i . 147 ( .OOl , f 
SPIFR NIGHT ACCIDENTS 
PER 1000 APPROACHES -.025 0037 I -.004 / , .050 ,026 0350 I 
DPIFR DAY ACCIDENTS 
PER 1000 APPROACHES .OOl .030 .003 .070 ,002 .ogo 
DPIFR NIGHT ACCIDENTS 
PER 1000 APPROACHES -.013 . 159 -.012 .070 .041 ,720 
TABLE 35 
NUMBER OF TOTAL NIGHT ACCIDENTS IN TERMS OF 
PILOT'S TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS 
PILOT TOTAL 200- 400- 600- IK- 2K- 
FLIGHT HOURS 399 599 999 l.gK 2.9K 
NIGHT ACCIDENTS 
1969-1975 1 11 9 13 23 29 
NIGHT ACCIDENTS 
1976-1979 1 5 13 22 33 18 
OTHER (DAY/DAWN/; 
DUSK) ACCIDENTS 1 
-;'R;;;;OCCURRED'[y[ 1; / 1; 1 1; j 1; 1 1; 
?,K ;",, I;!;, 
>15K TOTAL 
32 23 11 6 158 
18 14 6 4 134 
45 40 17 10 265 
52 48 50 50 ’ 52 / 
TABLE 36 
UNCONTROLLED COLLISIONS WITH GROUND/WATER IN TERMS 
OF VERTIGO AND ICING AS PRIMARY CAUSE FACTORS 
DPIFR LANDING 
PHASE 9 3 4 16 
SPIFR ENROUTE 
PHASE 30 11 21 62 
TOTAL 65 37 43 145 
TABLE 37 
VERTIGO INDUCED UNCONTROLLED COLLISIONS 
WITH GROUND/WATER 
CONDITION OF LIGHT VS. VARIOUS PHASES 
DAY DUSK/DAWN 
I NO. PERCENT I NO. PERCENT I 
SPIFR LANDING 
PHASE I I 5.0 19.2 / 19.0 / 73.1 
DPIFR LANDING 
PHASE 6.0 40.0 9.0 60.0 
SPIFR ENROUTE 
PHASE 17.0 58.6 10.0 34.5 
TOTAL 28.0 40.0 38.0 54.3 
PERCENT 
‘1 
2.0 I 6*9 
4.0 I 
TOTAL 
26.0 
15.0 
29.0 
70.0 
I 
I 
z 
W 
TABLE 38 
SPIFR VERTIGO INDUCED UNCONTROLLED COLLISIONS 
WITH GROUND/WATER 
CONDITION OF LIGHT VS. ACTUAL INSTRUMENT TIME 
* 
ACTUAL 
INSTR. TIME 0-g 10-19 20-39 40-59 60-99 100-199 200-299 300-499 
LANDING PHASE 
DAY 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
NIGHT 4 2 2 2 0 0 3 0 1 5 
ENROUTE PHASE 
DAY 2 1 1 1 0 3 0 2 1 6 
NIGHT 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
F 
TABLE 39 
SPIFR VERTIGO INDUCED UNCONTROLLED COLLISIONS 
WITH GROUND/WATER 
CONDITION OF LIGHT VS. TIME IN TYPE 
TOTAL 
TIME IN TYPE O-49 50-74 75-100 101-199 200-299 300-499 500-999 >lOOO 
LANDING PHASE 
DAY 0 2 0 7 1 1 0 0 
NIGHT 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 5 
ENROUTE PHASE 
DAY 2 2 1 
NIGHT 4 0 0 
-r .- ,-.-‘- 
TABLE 40 
SPIFR VERTIGO INDUCED UNCONTROLLED COLLISIONS 
WITH GROUND/WATER 
CONDITION OF LIGHT VS. TOTAL HOURS 
/ 
TOTAL TIME I-199 / 200-399 400-599 600-999 I-1.9K 2-2.9K >3..OK 
LANDING PHASE I 
DAY 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 
NIGHT 0 1 3 2 5 5 2 
ENROUTE PHASE 
DAY 0 0 2 5 3 2 4 
NIGHT 1 0 2 3 1 1 1 
TABLE 41 
SPIFR VERTIGO INDUCED UNCONTROLLED COLLISIONS 
WITH GROUND/WATER 
NIGHT ACCIDENTS VS. TOTAL NIGHT TIME 
-r 
TOTAL 
NIGHT TIME l-19 20-39 40-59 60-99 100-199 200-299 300-399 >400 
LANDING 
PHASE 2 3 0 2 4 0 3 2 
ENROUTE 
PHASE 0 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
TOTAL- 2 6 1 3 4 0 4 2 
TABLE 42 
SPIFR VERTIGO INDUCED UNCONTROLLED COLLISIONS WITH GROUND/WATER 
STATISTICAL PROFILES 
GA SURVEY 
RESPONSE PROFILE 
MEAN 
STD. DEVIATION 
MEDIAN 
SPIFR TOTAL 
ACCIDENT PROFILE 
MEAN 
STD. DEVIATION 
MEDIAN 
SPIFR LANDING 
PHASE VERTIGO 
MEAN 
STD. DEVIATION 
MEDIAN 
SAMPLE SIZE 
SPIFR ENROUTE 
PHASE VERTIGO 
MEAN 
STD. DEVIATION 
MEDIAN 
SAMPLE SIZE 
TOTAL TIME LAST ! ACTUAL I SIMULATED 
HOURS 90 DAYS < INSTRUMENT : INSTRUMENT 
, / 
3814 98 I 245 166 
4961 119 / 449 280 I 
2051 57 I II 150 75 
3868 
2 
I 320 95 
4457 499 164 
2394 71 I 150 61 
I 
2582 73 189 101 
3405 73 430 116 
1399 53 48 66 
26 20 20 16 
2802 59 128 63 
4282 51 230 
gi; 38 19 48 19 
z: 
17 
TABLE 43 
SPIFR ICING INDUCED UNCONTROLLED COLLISIONS WITH GROUND/WATER 
STATISTICAL PROFILES 
I 
TOTAL TIME LAST ACTUAL SIMULATED 
HOURS 90 DAYS INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT 
GA SURVEY 
RESPONSE PROFILE 
MEAN 3814 98 245 166 
STD. DEVIATION 4961 119 449 280 
MEDIAN 2051 57 150 75 
SPIFR TOTAL 
ACCIDENT PROFILE 
Y MEAN 3868 98: 320 95 
E 
STD. DEVIATION 
4457 499 
164 
MEDIAN 2394 71 150 61 
SPIFR LANDING 
PHASE ICING 
MEAN 2413 79 168 70 
STD. DEVIATION 2332 69 204 62 
MEDIAN 1672 65 114 62 
SAMPLE SIZE 22 17 13 8 
1 SPIFR ENROUTE 
i PHASE ICING I 
1 MEAN 2229 265 67 
I STD. DEVIATION 2240 
MEDIAN 
: 
;i 
223 
1367 : 27 219 
1 SAMPLE SIZE j 11 7 6 
- 
TABLE 44 
SPIFR UNCONTROLLED COLLISIONS WITH GROUND/WATER IN THE 
LANDING PHASE IN TERMS OF PILOT EXPERIENCE 
1 
~ HOURS o-49 50-99 100-199 2'0-299 >500 UNK 
TIME IN TYPE 
ICING 3 0 2 0 
VERTIGO 1 1 1 1 : 
--- 
ACTUAL INST HOURS 
ICING 5 4 1 0 1 10 
VERTIGO 10 2 0 1 1 5 
NIGHT HOURS 
ICING 1 0 0 1 17 
VERTIGO 2 ; 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL HOURS ** 
ICING 
VERTIGO 2 
6 4 6 0 0 4 1 
5 7 5 2 0 3 0 
1 
**Total hours is in IO's of hours. 
TABLE 45 
SPIFR CONTROLLED COLLISIONS - MEDIANS 
SPIFR DPIFR 
DAY I NIGHT DAY I NIGHT 
CEILING HEIGHT 500 300 400 300 
I I I 
VISIBILITY 
ACTUAL INSTRUMENT HOURS I 191.5 208.5 I 
SIM. INSTRUMENT HOURS 59 59 105 72 
TOTAL NIGHT HOURS 403 300 635 703 
I TIME LAST 24 HOURS 2 2 
TIME LAST 90 DAYS 116.0 I 
TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS 3800 I 
TIME IN TYPE 250 
PROXIMITY TO AIRPORT 2.00 
TABLE 46 
SPIFR NIGHT CONTROLLED COLLISIONS DURING 
LANDING PHASE FOR 1976-1979 
1976 1977 
NIGHT APPROACHES 
FLOWN 82872 94412 11g102 
NIGHT CONTROLLED 
COLISIONS 6 12 21 23 16 
RATE PER 1000 
APPROACHES .072 .I27 . 176 .I71 . 144 
OVERALL NIGHT ACCIDENT 
m RATE/l000 APPROACHES . 181 ,286 .311 .261 l 259 
242 -L CONTROLLED COLLISION 
RATE/NIGHT RATE -398 .444 .566 -655 0556 
TABLE 47 
SPIFR NIGHT CONTROLLED COLLISIONS, LANDING PHASE 
CAUSE FACTOR COMPARISON 
4 
WEATHER BELOW MINIMUMS FATAL ACCIDENTS ALL ACCIDENTS 
CAUSE FACTOR: 1964-1975 1976-1979 1964-1975 1976-1979 1964-1975 1976-1979 
1 IMPROPER IFR PROC. 5 5 9 19 16 29 
2 AIRCRAFT ICING 0 0 3 2 9 6 
3 DISTRACTED/DIVERTED ATTN 0 0 1 0 7 0 
4 SUSPECT MISREAD INST. 2 1 4 0 9 1 
5 FAULTY INSTRUMENT 3 1 2 5 9 7 
7 iz 6 DESCENDED BELOW MINS 20 1 21 0 44 4 - 
7 MISJUDGED ALTITUDE I 0 0 1 2 5 2 
8 A/C NOT PROPERLY EQUIPPED 1 1 0 1 2 1 
9 DIDN'T FLY PUB APPROACH 0 1 :5 3 5 4 
10 PILOT EXCEEDED CAPABIL. 0 1 i 2 2 
11 PILOT INCAPACITATED 0 0 2 1 
; 12 VERTIGO 0 0 1 1 
TOTAL 31 11 51 36 
TABLE 48 - SPIFR NIGHT CONTRO 
OPERATIONAL CAUSE FACTOR 
ACCIDENTS 
1964-1975 
IMPROPER IFR A/C NOT PRO- 
PROCEDURE PERLY EQUIPPED 
83 20 
ACCIDENTS 
1976-1979 44 14 
Y 
ti PROPORTION OCCUR- 
RING 1976-1979 .346 ,412 
LOWER 95 PERCENT 
CONFIDENCE INTERVAL .26 .25 
UPPER 95 PERCENT 
CONFIDENCE INTERVAL .43 .58 - 
aLED COLLISIONS 
COMPARISON 
I 
MISJUDGED PILOT TOTAL 
ALTITUDE INCAPACITATED 
5 3 111 
2 2 62 
.286 -358 
005 l 03 
.62 083 
TABLE 49 
SPIFR NIGHT CONTROLLED COLLIiIONS WITH GROUND/WATER 
LANDING PHASE 1964-1979 - PILOT EXPERIENCE 
I + 
HOURS O-19 20-39 40-59 60-99 100-199 200-299 300-399 400-499 500-999 >1000 
TOTAL ACTUAL 
INSTRUMENT HOURS 14 12 6 21 25 15 9 5 12 13 
TOTAL SIMULATED 
INSTRUMENT HOURS 8 11 33 35 10 2 0 1 2 0 
TOTAL NIGHT 
FLIGHT HOURS 6 5 6 10 27 10 13 8 23 23 
TOTAL TIME 
IN TYPE 10 13 8 13 19 16 9 6 19 29 
E bP 
TABLE 50 - SPIFR DAY CONTROLLED COLLISIONS WITH GROUND/WATER 
LANDING PHASE 1964-1979 
LAST 90 DAYS 
LAST 24 HOURS 
TABLE 51 
COMPARISON OF DAY AND NIGHT CONTROLLED COLLISIONS (C/C> 
IN PERCENTAGES OF ACCIDENTS BY EXPERIENCE LEVEL. 
o-99 100-199 200-299 300-399 400-499 500-999 >I000 ACCDNTS 
ACTUAL INST HOURS 
NIGHT C/C .40 l ‘9 11 
DAY C/C .38 .I2 :17 
.07 .04 -09 .I0 132.00 
-09 .09 .07 007 42.00 
SIMULATED INST HOURS 
NIGHT C/C -85 10 
:15 
.02 0.00 .Ol .02 0.00 102.00 
DAY C/C -73 -03 .06 .03 0.00 0.00 33.00 
TIME IN TYPE 
NIGHT C/C l 31 -13 .I1 .06 .04 -13 .20 142.00 
DAY C/C .I9 .I7 ~ .I1 l 09 .06 .I7 .21 I 1 53.00 
L 
o- 200- 400- 600- l.OK- 1.5K- 2.OK- 3.OK- 5.OK- TOTAL ; 
199 399 599 999 1.4K 1.9K 2.9K 4.9K 9.9K >lOK ACCDNTS 
TOTAL HOURS 
NIGHT C/C .Ol 005 .08 11 12 .09 12 18 l 17 .08 
DAY C/C 0.00 0.00 009 :05 :09 .05 :17 :17 .24 . 12 
169.00 
66.00 
1 
TIME LAST 90 DAYS 
NIGHT C/C 
D/AY C/C 
TIME LAST 24 HOURS 
NIGHT C/C 
DAY C/C 
TABLE 52 - SPIFR CONTROLLED COLLISIONS WITH GROUND/WATER 
STATISTICAL PROFILES. 
TOTAL 
HOURS 
GA SURVEY 
RESPONSE PROFILE 
MEAN 
STD. DEVIATION 
MEDIAN 
3814 98 
4961 1'9 
2051 57 
SPIFR TOTAL 
ACCIDENT PROFILE 
MEAN 3868 
5" 
STD. DEVIATION 4457 
w MEDIAN 2394 
NIGHT CONTROLLED 
COLLISIONS 
MEAN 3775 
STD. DEVIATION 4464 
MEDIAN 2365 
DAY CONTROLLED 
COLLISIONS 
MEAN 
STD. DEVIATION 
MEDIAN 
5041 
4893 
3134 
I 
L 
TIME LAST ! ACTUAL SIMULATED ~ 
90 DAYS INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT 
245 
449 
150 
166 
~/ 280 ~ 
II / 75 
;: 
71 
320 
499 
150 
1:: 
61 
104 341 
90 545 
69 145 
2 276 312 101 1
a4 '91 59 
TABLE 53 - SPIFR SIMULATED INSTRUMENT HOURS VS TYPE 
OF AIRCRAFT (CONTROLLED COLLISIONS DAY AND NIGHT). 
SIMULATED INSTRUMENT TIME O-19 20-39 40-59 60-99 loo-199 200-299 300-399 400-499 >500 TOTAL 
SINGLE ENGINE 
FIXED GEAR 2 2 8 6 0 0 1 0 0 19 
SINGLE ENGINE 
RETRACTABLE GEAR 
4 3 14 14 2 2 0 0 0 39 
TWIN ENGINE 
PISTON 
TURBO-PROP 
TOTAL PERCENTAGE 
TABLE 55 - CONTROLLED COLLISIONS: DAY/NIGHT SINGLE VERSUS TWIN 
ENGINE AIRCRAFT BY TIME IN TYPE 
HOURS O-19 20-39 40-59 60-99 loo-199 200-299 300-399 400-499 500-999 >lOOO REPORTED 
DAYTIME 
SINGLE ENGINE ; 0.00 .I1 0.00 .06 .28 .06 .I7 0.00 .06 .28 18.00 
TWIN ENGINE .03 .I0 0.00 .08 .I5 -13 -05 .08 .21 .18, 39.00 
NIGHTTIME 
SINGLE ENGINE l 07 .13 10 10 11 -13 .07 003 .I1 .I5 61.00 
TWIN ENGINE l 07 .06 :03 :08 :14 .I0 .07 l 05 -15 .24 86.00 
HOURS o-99 100-299 300-499 500-999 >I000 
DAYTIME 
SINGLE ENGINE .I7 -34 .I7 .06 .28 
TWIN ENGINE .21 .28 . 13 .21 . 18 
NIGHTTIME 
SINGLE ENGINE .40 .24 .I0 11 .I5 
TWIN ENGINE .24 .24 . 12 :15 .24 
TABLE 56: SPIFR NIGHT CONTROLLED COLLISIONS DURING THE LANDING PHASE 
VERSUS VISIBILITY 
VISIBILITY (MI) 0 -25 .5 .75 1 2 3 4 5 >5 TOTAL 
NIGHT SPIFR 7 20 24 13 35 38 15 17 1 3 173 
DAY SPIFR 5 14 6 5 10 14 9 0 0 2 65 
NIGHT DPIFR 2 7 3 6 
I 
9 11 1 2 ) 2 0 1 43 
_--- 
3 3 3 2 6 2 2 1 2 0 24 
NIGHT SPIFR % .04 .I2 .14 -07 .20 .22 .og .I0 .Ol .02 
b DAY SPIFR % .08 .22 -09 .08 .I5 .22 .I4 0.00 0.00 -03 
0 \ I 
NIGHT DPIFR % .05 .I9 .08 .I6 .24 -30 -03 -05 -05 0.00 
DAY DPIFR % .I2 .I2 .I2 .08 -25 -08 -08 .04 .08 0.00 i 
TABLE 57 
SPIFR NIGHT CONTROLLED COLLISIONS DURING THE LANDING PHASE 
VISIBILITY VERSUS PROXIMITY TO AIRPORT 
ETY (MI) [ 0 1 .25 j -5 1 .75 1 1 2 3 I4 I 
DAY SPIFR 
WITHIN AIRPORT SIGHT 1 2 3 2 
DAY SPIFR VISIBILITY 
LESS THAN DISTANCE 4 12 3 3 
F- 
;r= NIGHT SPIFR 
WITHIN AIRPORT SIGHT 1 8 6 5 
NIGHT SPIFR VISIBILITY 
LESS THAN DISTANCE 1 6 / 12 118 1 8 
-L 8 7 3 0 0 2 28 4-l 
O 137 I 6 0 0 
10 4 8 1 87 
5 5 0 2 85 
TABLE 58 
SPIFR NIGHT CONTROLLED COLLISIONS DURING THE LANDING PHASE 
CAUSE FACTOR VERSUS TYPE OF APPROACH 
CAUSE FACTOR: 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 12 TOTAL 
VOR/TVOR STRAIGHT-IN 2 3 1 2 3 13 1 0 2 2 0 0 29 
VOR/TVOR CIRCLING 2 1 1 2 14 10 10 0 013 
VOR/DME STRAIGHT-IN 1 10 0 0 2 0 0 0 10 0 5 
VOR/DME CIRCLING 2 0 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 4 
ADF STRAIGHT-IN 6 0 0 0 0 4 10 11 0 0 13 
m 
b N 
CAUSE FACTOR CODES: 
1. Improper IFR procedures 7. Misjudged altitude 
Icing related 8. A/c not properly equipped 
:: Pilot distracted/diverted attention 9. Did not fly published approach 
4. Suspect instrument misread 10. Conditions exceeded pilot's capabilites 
5. Faulty instrument 11. Pilot incapacitated 
6. Descended below minimums 12. Spatial disorientation (Vertigo) 
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15. Supplementary Notes 
Langley technical monitor: David A. Hinton 
Final Report 
6. Abstract 
The aircraft accident data recorded and maintained by the National Transpor- 
tation Safety Board (NTSB) for 1964-1979 were analyzed to determine what problems 
exist in the general aviation (GA) single pilot instrument flight rules (SPIFR) 
environment. A previous study conducted in 1978 for the years 1964-1975 provided 
a basis for comparison. 
The purpose of the research and analysis upon which this report is based was 
to determine what changes, if any, have occurred in trends and cause-effect rela- 
tionships reported in the earlier study. The increasing numbers have been tied 
to measures of activity to produce accident rates which in turn were analyzed in 
terms of change. Where anomalies or unusually high accident rates were encountered, 
further analysis was conducted to isolate pertinent patterns of cause factors and/or 
experience levels of involved pilots. The bulk of the effort addresses accidents 
in the landing phase of operations. 
Detailed analysis was performed on controlled/uncontrolled collisions and their 
unique attributes delineated. Estimates of day vs. night general aviation activity 
and accident rates were obtained. 
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